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Introduction
The Internet has evolved from a closed network (then called Arpanet)1
available to a limited number of U.S. officials. and universities to a world-
wide network available to virtually anybody, through the World Wide Web
(the Web). 2 This evolution resulted in the dissemination of digital infor-
mation, coded in HyperText Markup Protocol (HTML) and available at its
1. The Pentagon created Arpanet in 1969, after two scientists at UCLA had man-
aged to connect two computers together. Nicolas Valluet, Presentation Generale des
Nouvelles Technologies de Communication et d'Information, LES PETITES AFFICHES, no. 134,
at 8 (Nov. 6, 1996).
2. Id. The Internet is distinct from the World Wide Web. Internet represents an
infrastructure (all the computers linked together), a community of users, and the data
they share. The World Wide Web is a network of computers linked together on the
Internet that deliver data through their virtual links. Fran~oise Tajan, Presentation
d'Internet et d'un Serveur Web, LEs PETITES AFFICHES, no. 134, at 10 (Nov. 6, 1996); see
also Alain Strowel & Nicolas Ide, Liability of Internet Intermediaries: Recent Developments
and the Question of Hyperlinks, 185 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3, 15-23
(2000).
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unique address, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL). 3 Both the codifica-
tion and the localization of digital information make it available from any
computer connected to the World Wide Web through a software, the
browser.4 Posting, finding, and accessing information on the Web is made
possible by intermediaries: the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that
encompass Internet Access Providers (IAPs), Internet Content Providers
(ICPs), and Logical Access Providers (LAPs). 5
The accessibility of vast amounts of information has challenged the
traditional legal structure of intellectual property law and of torts. Posting
information on the Web and copying possibly copyrighted materials is
fairly easy. This explains why defamation and copyright infringement
have revealed the weaknesses of the traditional legal structure and proves
the accompanying need for adaptation and legislative innovation.6 Techno-
logical innovation and widespread accessibility to information have turned
anything posted on the Web into a potential public good since the Web is
both non-rival and possibly non-excludable. 7
The Web offers numerous commercial services, often accessible
within an international framework; therefore, some infractions on the
Internet involve international legal issues with important economic and
business implications. Courts in the United States and in France have
illustrated these polycentric topics in decisions extensively discussed by
the media and scholars.8 In the United States, the focus has long been on
3. Jo Dale Carothers, Protection of Intellectual Property on the World Wide Web: Is the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act Sufficient?, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 937, 939-42 (1999).
4. Id.
5. David N. Weiskopf, The Risks of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practi-
tioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998); see also Jose I. Rojas, Liability of ISPs, Con-
tent Providers and End-Users on the Internet, 507 PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. 1009, 1016-17
(1998). IAPs offer links to the Internet and generally nothing more. ICPs generally offer
a link to the Internet and display contents on their specific spaces. LAPs provide search
engines and other tools relating to the localization of content on the Internet. In this
Note, the author will refer to ISPs indistinctly. However, LAPs do not fall under the
scope of this Note. Moreover, whenever this Note will address specific ISP liability, it
will also describe the kind of services they offer; this will qualify, when necessary, the
specific category or categories of ISPs concerned.
6. See generally Jennifer Burke Sylva, Digital Delivery and Distribution of Music and
Other Media: Recent Trends in Copyright Law; Relevant Technologies; and Emerging Busi-
ness Models, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 217 (2000). On the French general approach to
regulation and the Internet, see Minist~re de l'conomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie
[French Department of Economy, Finance and Industry], Consultation publique sur
l'adaptation du cadre legislatif de la societe de l'information: Compte-rendu general de la
Consultation, at http://www.finances.gouv.fr, Vie des Entreprises: Acc~s Th~matique:
Nouvelles Technologies Files (Apr. 2000).
7. Those economic terms apply well to the Internet. It is 'non-rival' because theo-
retically an infinite number of users, facilities permitting, can access a Web site and its
pages at the same time. It is 'non-excludable' because it is technically difficult to exclude
specific users from using posted information.
8. For a thoughtful presentation of the main legal topics relating to the Internet in
the U.S., see generallyJeffrey P. Cunard et al., Selected Topics in Internet and E-Commerce
Law, 627 PRACTISING L. INST. PAT. 381 (2000).
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Napster's alleged copyright infringements; 9 in France, the Yahoo! case,
related to the passionate debate over the display and sales of Nazi
memorabilia on an auction Web site, has drawn attention. 10 In both coun-
tries, despite new specific regulations, ISPs may remain liable in the United
States under the traditional common law and in France under the Civil and
Penal Laws. This Note analyzes the convergences between both systems
and discusses the remaining differences. It also argues that although these
differences may call for harmonization, uniformity is both illusory and
unnecessary.
Part I of this Note describes the French and U.S. judicial solutions
developed before the legislatures implemented a statutory framework to
assess ISP liability. U.S. courts and many French courts have analogized
ISP liability to the one of media actors.1" As a result, the scope of ISP
liability under defamation law has been uncertain depending on whether
courts analogized ISPs to publishers or to distributors. Noticeably, uncer-
tainty also prevailed regarding the critical issue of ISP liability for third-
party infringements, in particular for online copyright infringement. 12
Part II discusses the factors that led courts, in each country, first to
focus on the ISPs among the different actors of the Web, and second to
formulate similar standards of assessment of their liability. 13 Part II also
describes the legislative creativity that first appeared in the United States
and then came to the European Union and France. The frameworks imple-
mented adopt the general principle of a limited liability of the ISPs in cer-
tain conditions. 1 4 International influences combined with national
concerns to structure these statutory and regulatory schemes.1 5
9. See generally Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto the Future Cop-
yright Law in the Internet Age, J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755 (2000).
10. Ass'n Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000,
Ord. ref., J.C.P. 2000, Actu., 2219, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgiparis20001120.pdf (last visited 6 Sept. 2001).
11. See infra Part I.A.1. and I.A.2.
12. Concerning the U.S. case law, see Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 34 (stating that the
case law is unclear as to the conditions and grounds required to hold an ISP liable for
copyright infringement); see also Douglas B. Luftman, Defamation Liability for On-Line
Services: The Sky Is Not Falling, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1071, 1088-98 (1997) (assessing
the consistency of online defamation law). Relating to the French case law, see Cyril
Rojinsky, L'approche communautaire de la responsabilite des acteurs de l'internet, EXPER-
TISES, Oct. 11, 2000, no. 241, at 297, available at http://www.juriscom.net/pro/2/
resp20001011.htm (Oct. 2000).
13. Agathe Lepage, Du sens de la mesure en matitre de responsabilitg civile sur
internet: la loi, la jurisprudence et lefournisseur d'hebergement, D. 2001, doct.322. For
the standards that the French courts have developed, see Lionel Thoumyre, Respon-
sabilite des hebergeurs: detours et contours de l'obligation de vigilance, CAHIERS LAMY DROIT
DE L'LNFORMATIQUE ET DES RESEAUX, 127 (July 2000), at 5-9, available at http://
www.juriscom.net/pro/2/resp200008O5.htm (Aug. 5, 2000). For the standards found
in the U.S., see Weiskopf, supra note 5.
14. Valerie S~dallian, La responsabilite des prestataires techniques sur Internet dans le
Digital Millennium Copyright Act americain et le projet de directive europeen sur le com-
merce tlectronique, at http://www.juriscom.net/pro/1/resp19990101.htm (Jan. 1999).
15. For France, see Ministate de l'Economie et des Finances, supra note 6. For the
U.S., see Carothers, supra note 3, at 943.
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Part III stresses salient differences between both systems. Substantial
and fundamental divergences exist, as illustrated by the issue of illicit con-
tent on the Web and the Yahoo! case. 16
The conclusive part of this Note shows that in some respects, this out-
come calls for harmonization. The French and U.S. legislatures, however,
have respectively decided that French general law and the common law in
the U.S. should still govern ISP liability. Since French and U.S. substantive
laws are different, a uniform definition of ISP liability is illusory. However,
uniformity is also unnecessary. What really matters is whether ISPs can
easily assess the legal risks of operating business in France and/or in the
United States in order to make informed decisions about their business
strategies. A uniform definition of conflict of jurisdiction rules, narrowly
tailored to ISPs and limiting extraterritorial jurisdiction, could be a solu-
tion.17 Another solution, more feasible, would be a common definition of
safe harbors limiting the risk of damaging and unexpected exposure to dif-
ferences in national substantive laws. A narrowly defined but transversal
immunity (regarding all the areas of the substantive law) would make it
unnecessary to achieve the illusory goal of harmonizing several bodies of
national substantive laws. It would also increase ISPs' incentives to pro-
mote self-regulation and technical devices to screen potentially illegal con-
tent on the Internet.
I. Background
A. Tradition as Illusion of Permanence: Definition of an Editorial
Liability for ISPs
U.S. courts and some French courts have considered the Internet as a new
but still ordinary device of mass-communication; thus, they initially
assessed ISP liability in comparison to the traditional screening abilities of
a publisher or a distributor. 18
1. Common Law Editorial Liability in the United States
Under defamation law, U.S. courts have traditionally held ISPs strictly lia-
ble for the defamatory material to which they gave access.19 This common
understanding (or misunderstanding) of the role of an ISP, however, did
16. Ass'n Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, May 22,
2000, Ord. R., D. 2000, IR172, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgiparis20000522.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
17. The French Yahoo! case has provided inspiration to many commentators on this
specific point. Jean Eaglesham, A Lost Connection: A French Decision to Hold Yahoo!
Responsible for Allowing Access to Nazi Memorabilia in the US Raises Questions About the
Boundaries to Rulings by National Courts, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 21, 2000, at 28.
18. Rojas, supra note 5, at 1014-18 (1998). For France, see Halliday v. Lacambre,
CA Paris, 14e ch., Feb. 10, 1999, D. 1999, jur. 389, note N. Mallet-Poujol, available at
www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/illicite-divers/ca_100299.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2001) (drawing an analogy with the special regulations concerning the press to find the
defendant-ISP liable). For an international overview of the jurisprudence dealing with
online copyright infringement, see Strowel & Ide, supra note 2, at 89-145.
19. Luftman, supra note 12, at 1084-85.
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not survive under a closer functional examination. The U.S. jurisdictional
approach has evolved. The issue of liability was determined by analogy to
the print media and depends on the degree to which an ISP controls the
content available through its services. 20 This new standard made an ISP
closer to a distributor than to a publisher; it showed the understanding that
an ISP may have no editorial function, merely providing access to informa-
tion posted on the Web. 21 As a result, the prevailing rule provides that
"commercial on-line services must ascertain the extent to which they can
exercise editorial control before being held to a publisher's standard of def-
amation liability."'22 Applications of this standard, however, led to unsatis-
factory solutions because of the range of interpretations it allowed. 23 The
main obstacle to reaching a clear-cut solution for ISP liability was the quali-
fication of ISP's role as a publisher rather than as a distributor, which
involved a fact-based inquiry.
Far from providing incentive to control contents, whenever an ISP actu-
ally exercised or represented that it exercised sufficient control over the
contents at issue, courts would hold it to the same standard of liability as a
publisher. 2 4 If it exercised no control whatsoever, courts would analogize
it to a distributor and would not find liability.25 In Cubby, Inc. v. Com-
puserve, Inc., Compuserve, an ISP, proposed online information classified
by topics. 2 6 The plaintiffs claimed that one of the electronic newsletters
that Compuserve made available on its 'Journalism Forum' contained
defamatory contents.27 The court held that Compuserve had no opportu-
nity to review the contents of the information it was loading into its system,
as its subscribers instantaneously had access to the material uploaded.2 8
The court concluded that the defendant-ISP was the equivalent of an "elec-
tronic library" 29 and as such it had "no duty to monitor each issue of every
periodical [online publication] it distributes."30 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services Co., Prodigy, an ISP, proposed several forums, one of
which contained defamatory language about Stratton, a securities invest-
20. Id.
21. Thoumyre, supra note 13, at 6.
22. Luftman, supra note 12, at 1088.
23. For instance, compare Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) with Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Med. L. Rptr.
1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See also Mitchell P. Goldstein, Service Provider Liability for
Acts Committed by Users: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COM-
PUTER & INFO. L. 591, 627-32 (2000) (commenting on a "Split in the Courts: Cubby
Versus Stratton Oakmont.").
24. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137-39; see also Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 424 (2000)
("Ju]nder traditional standards of liability, publishers are liable for any defamatory con-
tent they publish; distributors are liable for defamatory content contained in the materi-
als that they distribute only if they know or have reason to know of the defamatory
statement.").
25. Stratton Oakmont, 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
26. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 137-39.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 140.
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ment banking firm, and its president. 3 1 In contrast to Cubby, the court
held the ISP liable as a publisher because it used a software program to
screen potentially offensive language, exercised editorial control, and repre-
sented to the public in numerous newspaper articles that it was indeed
screening the contents posted on its bulletin boards.3 2
The uncertainty of the rule lies in the amount of control that triggers
liability as a publisher. Commentators observed that courts should carry
a functional inquiry on the ISP's degree of control and the longevity of the
content posted. 33 The bulk of this inquiry is essentially an assessment of
the technology an ISP uses to exercise its alleged editorial control, which
might lead to inconsistent legal decisions. 34 In France, a different kind of
inconsistency prevailed.
2. Editorial Liability in France
In France, the case law developed inconsistent answers to whether an ISP
has an independent duty to control the contents to which it provides
access. 35 Many French courts, like U.S. courts, have considered the situa-
tion of the ISPs in relation to the legislation applicable to traditional media
actors. French scholars, however, drew a different analogy based on the
jurisprudence developed to deal with an endemic technology available to
the French public since the early 1980s: the minitel.3 6 This telecommuni-
cation device appeared in 1978 and allows the French public and profes-
sionals to create or to access databases in an interactive way. It is still in
use today despite the competition of the Internet. Minitel servers (serveurs)
have a specific address accessible through the phone network (reseau).
Users of a minitel3 7 can access online commercial services, visit compa-
nies' pages (pages minitel), operate bank transactions, or even be part of
chat forums (forums de discussion). The comparison of ISPs to the provid-
ers of minitel services might have influenced the French courts. As a
result, depending on the legal qualification given to Internet communica-
31. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995).
32. Id.
33. Luftman, supra note 12, at 1093-98 (stating that the Cubby court misperceived
the ISP's technological capabilities to screen the contents posted on its space).
34. Id.
35. Compare Halliday v. Lacambre, CA Paris, 14e ch., Feb. 10, 1999, D. 1999, jur.
389, note N. Mallet-Poujol, available at www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/illicitedivers/
ca 100299.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001), and Socit Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Ver-
sailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000, IR 270, available at http://www.juriscom.net/
txt/jurisfr/img/caversailles200006O8.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001) with SA Electre v.
SARL TI Communication, T. Com. Paris, May 7, 1999, at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/
jurisfr/da/tcparis19990507.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001), and Axa v. Infonie, TGI
Puteaux, Sept. 28, 1996, at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/diffamation/jug-ti-
puteaux_280999.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
36. Lionel Thoumyre, Responsabilitts sur le Web: une histoire de la reglementation des
reseaux numeriques, at http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v6-1/thoumyre.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2001).
37. Videographic terminal composed of a keyboard and a screen specifically
designed to access the minitel services.
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tions, different fragmented laws are applicable. For instance, Internet com-
munications can be qualified as press publications (publication de presse)
or as audio-visual communications (communications audiovisuelles).38
Other uncertainties appeared in the French case law.
In Lefebure v. Lacambre, the Tribunal de Grande Instance ("TGI") of
Paris found that ISPs were independently liable if they failed to check the
content of the information loaded to their space to make sure that their
content did not conflict with decency and third parties' rights.39 On
appeal, the Cour d'Appel of Paris (appellate court) confirmed the liability of
the ISP that allowed private (and nude) pictures of the French top model
Estelle Halliday to be posted on its space without authorization. 40 In a
similar context, however, the Tribunal de Commerce of Paris stated that an
ISP had no duty to check the content of such information, and therefore
incurred no independent liability for leaving loaded on its space defama-
tory information of which it was not aware.4 1 A few months later, the TGI
of Puteaux also refused to find an ISP liable in a case whose main facts
were similar to the ones of the U.S. Cubby case. 42 The corporate plaintiffs
claimed that the ISP left posted defamatory allegations about them.43 The
TGI of Puteaux refused to find the ISP liable since the subscribers' files
posted were automatically and instantaneously made available to users,
which made it impossible to conduct an a priori check of the contents.44
Nonetheless, in Lacoste v. Societe Multimania, the TGI of Nanterre defined a
three-fold obligation for ISPs: (1) an obligation to inform the people using
its space of the rights of third parties; (2) an obligation to use reasonable
means to screen contents illegal on their face; and (3) an obligation to react
in order to evict illegal contents. 45 This case concerned the unauthorized
38. Rojinsky, supra note 12. Articles 93-2 and 93-3 of the law no. 85-1317 of Dec.
13, 1985 (modifying the law no. 82-625 of July 29, 1982),J.O., Dec. 1985;JCP 1985, 111,
58022; the law no. 86-1067 of December 30, 1986, J.O., Oct. 1, 1986; JCP 1986, IlL,
59250; and the law of July 29, 1881 concerning the liberte de la presse offer the legal
combination applicable to ISPs. CODE CIVIL, App., p. 1813 (2000 ed., Code Dalloz 2000).
39. Lef~bure v. Lacambre, TGI Paris, June 9, 1998, at http://www.legalis.net/cgi-
iddn/french/affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=internet responsabilite.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2001); accord Lacoste v. Socit Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 1999, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry. Third-parties' rights encompass subjective rights like
the right to privacy or the right to control one's image, for instance.
40. Halliday v. Lacambre, CA Paris, 14e ch., Feb. 10, 1999, D. 1999,jur. 389, note N.
Mallet-Poujol, available at www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/illicite divers/ca_100299.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
41. SA Electre v. SARL TI Communication, T. Com. Paris, May 7, 1999, at http://
juriscom.net/txt/urisfr/da/tcparisl9990507.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
42. Axa v. Infonie, TGI Puteaux, Sept. 28, 1996 (finding that the ISP has no means to
control the content posted before it is made available to users), at http://
www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/diffamation/ug-ti-puteaux_280999.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2001).
43. Id.
44. Id. For the facts of Cubby, see Part I.A.1.
45. Lacoste v. Socit Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 1999, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry (holding that "the ISP has a general obligation of cau-
tiousness and diligence. It has the responsibility to take the necessary precautions to
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online display of nude pictures of a model that Multimania hosted.4 6 On
appeal, the Cour d'Appel of Versailles gave a more accurate definition of the
obligation of vigilance. The court stated that an ISP has no obligation to
check systematically the substance of the contents posted; it has only to
check when, while operating its technical tasks, it incidentally comes to
suspect that the material posted is illegal.4 7 In these inconsistent cases, as
in the United States, a determinative factor has been the courts' varying
assessments of the ISPs' screening ability. As a result, the legal situation of
ISPs is unclear.48 Moreover, in a recent decision, the TGI of Paris focused
on the conduct and good faith of the defendant-ISP once the judicial
authority had put it on notice of the defamatory content posted by one of
its subscribers to assess its liability. 49 This approach does not make
clearer the standard of evaluation of ISP liability in France. Uncertainties
also prevailed for online copyright infringements, both in the United States
and in France.
B. ISP Liability for Copyright Infringement
1. Artificial Distinctions and Confusion in the United States
In the United States, courts used three different theories to hold an ISP
liable for copyright infringement: direct liability, vicarious liability, and
contributory liability.50 A defendant-ISP is liable on the ground of direct
liability if it produces copies of a protected work that are substantially simi-
lar to the original. 5 1 This triggers strict liability. 52 Courts find vicarious
liability when the defendant-ISP has the right and ability to control the
direct infringer's acts and when it receives a direct financial benefit from
the infringement.5 3 Finally, courts find contributory infringement if the
defendant-ISP knows of the infringing activity and substantially partici-
prevent the infringement of third parties' rights and it has to take reasonable measures
of information, vigilance, and action.").
46. Id.
47. Socit Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Versailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000, IR
270, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/img/caversailles200006O8.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001); see also Thoumyre, supra note 36.
48. Thoumyre, supra note 36.
49. SA Ciriel v. SA Free, TGI Paris, Feb. 6, 2001 (holding that an ISP is not liable for
defamatory content posted by subscribers when it has promptly and in good faith
removed access to the Web site at stake once the judicial authority asked the ISP to do
so.), at http://juriscom.net/txt/urisfr/cti/tgiparis20010206.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2001).
50. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the liability of an ISP on the grounds of direct, con-
tributory and vicarious liability); see also Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 390-400. For a
discussion of the comparative merits of these theories see Wendy M. Melone, Note: Con-
tributory Liability for Access Providers: Solving the Conundrum Digitalization Has Placed
on Copyright Laws, 49 FED. COMM. LJ. 491 (1997).
51. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1367; see also Burke Sylva, supra note 6, at
225.
52. Rojas, supra note 5, at 1020-21.
53. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1375; see also Burke Sylva, supra note 6, at
225-26.
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pates in it. 5 4 The contours of these theories are unclear due to artificial
fact-based distinctions that appeared in numerous cases.
5 5
First, the direct liability theory is uncertain as applied to online
infringements. Protected works transmitted via the Internet are copies
under copyright legislation.56 However, the very nature of the data trans-
mission through the Internet makes this qualification unclear from the out-
set.5 7 When subscribers download information from the Internet, the
information automatically copies on the random access memory (RAM) of
their computers without intervention of an ISP.58 The key issue is whether
courts should require volition to hold ISPs liable for direct infringement.
Although some courts answered in the negative, 5 9 most follow the
landmark decision 60 of the Northern District of California in Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line. 6 1 In Religious Technology, the court
held that ISPs are not direct infringers when they do not perform volitional
acts.6 2 In that case, a third party had posted infringing copies of texts by
Ron Hubbard, which had automatically created temporary copies of them
on the ISP's server.6 3 The court gave practical reasons why it would be
unreasonable to hold ISPs liable for copies ordered by users.6 4 Another
court found, however, that a program which automatically selects adult-
oriented contents from different Web sites and then posts them on the Web
site of an ISP triggers direct infringement. 65 As a result, the volitional
requirement is clumsy and courts have already stretched it in opposite
directions. 66 For instance, in Playboy Enterprises v. Frena, the court held
directly liable a Bulletin Board Service operator (BBS). 6 7 Although the
defendant alleged that its subscribers were the ones responsible for upload-
ing the pictures and that it had no knowledge of the copyright infringe-
ment, 68 the court found the ISP liable for displaying Playboy's copyrighted
54. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1373; see also Burke Sylva, supra note 6, at
225-26.
55. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 593 ("[b]ecause the standard of liability in this area
is uncertain, Internet and online service providers have no assurances that they will be
protected.").
56. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "the loading of software into the RAM creates a copy under the Copyright
Act.").
57. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 19.
58. Id. at 19-20.
59. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
60. 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-70 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
61. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 21-25; see also Ian C. Ballon & Keith M.
Kupferschmid, Third Party Liability Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: New Lia-
bility Limitations and More Litigation for ISPs, 3 CYBERSPACE LAW. 3 (1998), at LEXIS, Law
Reviews and Bar Journals Library.
62. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1369-74.
63. Id. at 1368-69.
64. Id. at 1369-70.
65. Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 553 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
66. Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 398-99 (referencing cases that ruled differently on
ISP's direct liability).
67. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
68. Id. at 1554, 1558.
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photographs on its BBS.6 9 This ruling is clearly distinct from the one in
Religious Technology.70
Second, vicarious liability is imprecise with respect to the require-
ments of ability to control and of direct benefit. Two leading cases dealt
with the question of ISP liability when a subscriber infringes a copyrighted
work: Religious Technology 71 and Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of
Fire Equipment Distributors.72 In Religious Technology, Erlich, the direct
infringer, contracted with Klemesrud to post his content on the latter's Bul-
letin Board;73 Klemesrud had contracted with Netcom, an ISP, to gain
access to the Internet.7 4 The plaintiff sued Netcom for the infringements of
its subscriber's customer (Erlich) who allegedly posted copyrighted
texts.7 5 In Marobie, the plaintiff sued the ISP because its subscriber alleg-
edly posted copyrighted images on a Web page. 76 Both District Courts
reached the same outcome and limited ISP liability under the vicarious lia-
bility theory. 77 Both courts considered the issue of the degree of supervi-
sion that ISPs are able to exercise over their subscribers' contents and
concluded that technology permitted supervision, albeit limited.78 In
addition, both courts concluded that ISPs which bill their subscribers a flat
fee service do not directly benefit from the infringing activity. 7 9 Therefore,
they did not find vicarious liability, as the plaintiff failed to prove that the
ISP directly benefited from the infringements.8 0 In so doing, these courts
have taken the view that the ISP-subscriber relation is equivalent to the
landlord-tenant relation.8 1
However, the binding effect of these decisions is weak,8 2 as those deci-
sions did not make clear the level of control that would result in the liabil-
69. Id. at 1556-57.
70. One commentator noticed that contrary to the ISP in Religious Technology, Frena
directly benefited from the infringing activity and that the true infringer was unknown.
Goldstein, supra note 23, at 598. However, the classical definition of direct liability for
copyright infringement does not refer to the ISP's knowledge and alleged direct benefit.
71. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
72. Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D.
111. 1997).
73. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1365-66.
76. Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1171-72.
77. Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1179; accord Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp.
at 1376-77.
78. Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1179; accord Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp.
at 1376-77.
79. Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1179; accord Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp.
at 1376-77.
80. Marobie-FL, Inc., 983 F. Supp. at 1179; accord Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp.
at 1376-77.
81. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringe-
ment, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1844 (2000).
82. Id. at 1849-52.
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ity of an ISP under the vicarious liability theory. 83 First, two different
approaches of the notion of "control" can lead to a distinct standard of
liability for ISPs. Under the "actual-control" approach, there is no control
for vicarious liability purposes so long as a defendant cannot "take mean-
ingful steps to prevent infringement. 8s 4 In contrast, under the "legal con-
trol" approach, "[a]ny evidence of legal control, via contract, agency, or
even control unrelated to the infringement, opens the door to a finding of
vicarious liability."'8 5 This difference is a factor of confusion.8 6 Second,
some courts could analogize ISPs to dance-hall owners rather than to land-
lords, which in contrast would expand ISP liability.8 7 Usually, a landlord
is not liable for the copyright infringements of her tenant when the former
has no knowledge of the wrongs, has no supervision over those, and does
not benefit from the infringing activity.8 8 In contrast, a dance hall proprie-
tor is liable for the wrongdoings of a band that illegally performs copy-
righted works in the dance hall, as it benefits the proprietor.8 9 Moreover,
just like a landlord, an ISP that has knowledge of the infringing activity
may risk liability if it remains passive. 90 One commentator remarked that
"[n]umerous opinions consider dance-hall proprietors vicariously liable for
copyright infringement committed by performers while excusing landlords
from liability for the acts of their tenants."91 Third, courts gave more or
less stringent definitions of the legal definition of "direct benefit." For
instance, in Fonovisa, the Ninth Circuit defined "direct benefit" in a liberal
way so that any benefit accruing from the visits of customers interested in
the infringing material and paying an admission fee is a "direct financial
83. Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for
Copyright Infringement Into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L.
REV. 1005, 1021-22 (2000) (noting that "In]one of the few cases that have ruled on on-
line vicarious liability in general have provided a definition of 'control,"' and that neither
Religious Technology, nor Marobie have clarified this issue.).
84. Id. at 1013.
85. Id. at 1016.
86. Id. at 1020 (noting the split among circuits over the notion of "control").
87. Yen, supra note 81, at 1849-73; see also Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 36-37 (noting
that "[c]ourts have struggled to clearly define what circumstances constitute sufficient
'ability to control' in the online context in order to impose vicarious liability.").
88. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 606.
89. Id.; see also Wright, supra note 83, at 1011 (stating that "[flirst, the so-called
'landlord-tenant' cases absolved a landlord of responsibility for the infringing activities
of a tenant if the landlord lacked notice of the infringement at the creation of the lease.
In contrast, the 'dance-hall' cases attached liability to proprietors of entertainment
venues for the infringing performances of musical compositions by bands and
orchestras.").
90. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 608.
91. Yen, supra note 81, at 1844-45 (stating that dance hall owners meet: (1) the
requirement of supervision since they own the premise where the infringing activity
takes place and are able to prevent it; (2) the requirement of direct benefit since they
receive payment from the admission of patrons who want to attend the infringing activ-
ity); see also Goldstein, supra note 23, at 606 ("The cases are legion which hold the
dance hall proprietor liable for the infringement of copyright resulting from the per-
formance of a musical composition by a band or orchestra whose activities provide the
proprietor with a source of customers and enhanced income.").
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benefit."9 2 Therefore, the aftermath of Religious Technology and Marobie is
still difficult to ascertain. 9 3 Despite these decisions, one commentator
even stated that "Internet operations are at a high risk of being found vicar-
iously liable for infringing activities occurring on their networks." 94
Finally, the lack of precision for the definition of the requirement of
knowledge of the infringing activity may affect the use of contributory lia-
bility. 95 In Sega Enterprises v. MAPHIA, the court focused on whether the
ISP-defendant had actual knowledge of the infringements to hold it lia-
ble.96 In fact, the ISP had actual knowledge and even encouraged the post-
ing of pirated copies of copyrighted video games on its Web site to be later
downloaded by other subscribers. 9 7 The court held the ISP would likely be
found both directly and contributorily liable.98 However, facts do not
always demonstrate an ISP's actual level of knowledge. The leading case,
Religious Technology,99 dealt with the issue of an ISP that had no actual
knowledge of the infringing activity. The court held that an ISP obtains
sufficient knowledge for contributory liability purposes upon notification
of the infringing activity and where the ISP has no reason to suspect a
colorable claim of non-infringement. 10 0 Even without being on notice, an
ISP also has a duty to make some search, for instance, by use of search
engines on key words that would help to reveal conspicuous infringe-
ments.10 1 Nonetheless, the definition of "colorable claim of non-infringe-
ment" remains vague. 10 2 It just substitutes the issue of the level of an ISP's
knowledge with the issue of the level of conspicuousness of alleged
infringements. 10 3 Moreover, one author noted that some courts may hold
ISPs to have constructive knowledge of infringements because they provide
92. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1996) (stat-
ing that a revenue accruing from the visits of customers interested in the infringing
material and paying an admission fee is a "direct financial benefit").
93. Yen, supra note 81, at 1849-72 (providing a thoughtful discussion of the case law
concerning vicarious liability for copyright matters and analogies with 'dance-hall'
cases).
94. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 38.
95. Depending on the court, a material or substantial contribution to the infringing
activity is also required. However, the majority of courts admit that supplying Internet
facilities can be sufficient to meet this requirement. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 30-32
(discussing the issue of ISPs' participation in the infringing activity); see also Rojas,
supra note 5, at 1026-27 (giving examples of cases holding that supplying facilities to
carry on the infringing activity is sufficient contribution for purposes of contributory
liability). For a general discussion, see Goldstein, supra note 23, at 602-06.
96. Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
97. Id.
98. Id. The court subsequently granted Sega both summary judgment and an
injunction, holding the ISP-defendant liable for copyright infringement. Sega Enters. v.
MAPHIA, 948 F.Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
99. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
100. Id. at 1374.
101. See id. at 1374-75.
102. See Yen, supra note 81, at 1876-79.
103. Id.
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the facilities necessary for the infringing activity. 10 4 Thus, courts did not
clearly articulate the notion of knowledge for contributory liability
purposes.
2. A Famous Illustration of ISP Liability for Third Party Copyright
Infringement in the United States: Napster
The famous Napster case illustrates the application of contributory and
vicarious liabilities to ISPs. 105 An audio compression technology (MP3)
allows audio recordings to be copied onto a computer hard drive. Napster
used this technology to:
(1) [M]ake MP3 music files stored on individual computer hard drives avail-
able for copying by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files
stored on other users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the con-
tents of other users' MP3 files from one computer to another via the
Internet. 106
Napster also provided on-line "technical support for the indexing and
searching of MP3 files."'1 7 No copy of digital music was stored or circu-
lated on Napster's server,' 08 which made unavailable a claim of direct
infringement against Napster. Napster's users who uploaded or
downloaded MP3 copies of copyrighted musical works were the direct
infringers. 10 9 Referring to Napster executives' internal documents, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California deter-
mined that Napster had actual knowledge of the exchange of pirated
music.' 10 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff had sent a notice of
infringement to Napster."'l On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that Nap-
ster actually knew that its users pirated specific musical works and failed
to remove access to these files.1 12 In addition, the District Court found
that Napster "suppli[ed] the proprietary software, search engine, servers,
and means of establishing a connection between users' computers," 1 13
which amounted to a material contribution to the infringing activity. 1 14
Thus, the court concluded that Napster was more likely than not contribu-
torily liable. 115 The Ninth Circuit confirmed this conclusion. 116
The court further determined that Napster had "the right and ability
to supervise its users' infringing conduct"' 1 7 and that it had a direct bene-
104. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 29-30.
105. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
106. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
107. Id.
108. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905-08.
109. Id. at 911.
110. Id. at 917.
111. Id.
112. 239 F.3d at 1022.
113. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 239 F.3d at 1021, 1022.
117. 114 F. Supp. 2d at 921.
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fit in the infringing activity, as it expanded its user base in order to gener-
ate and increase future revenues. 118 Thus, the court concluded that
Napster was also more likely than not to be vicariously liable. 1 19 The
appellate court also affirmed this conclusion.' 20 This case is a straightfor-
ward illustration of ISP contributory and vicarious liability for on-line
copyright infringement. However, it does not mean that the application of
those theories is without uncertainties, as discussed above. Under the facts
of Napster, there may not have been difficulty in proving the ISP's actual
knowledge of its users' infringing activity and its direct benefits. However,
this case did not clearly address the question of the kind of control
required to find an ISP liable on the ground of contributory liability.
3. France: General Law 121 Approach and Case Law Loophole
In France, both civil and penal liabilities could concern ISPs. 12 2 Civil lia-
bility of ISPs is based on articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Civil Code
and. French courts have already invoked it for ISPs. 1 23 Those provisions
are broad and French courts have used them both for violations of privacy,
illicit content and copyright infringement. For ISPs, penal liability could
be based on articles 121-6 and 121-7 of the French Penal Code but there is
no record of courts using this hook for ISPs.
a. ISP Liability for Copyright Infringement Under the French Civil
Code
Article 1382 of the French Civil Code states that "anyone who, through her
act, causes damage to another by her fault shall be obliged to compensate
the damage."'124 Article 1383 of the French Civil Code goes further and
provides that "everyone is responsible for the damage caused not only by
her own act but also by her negligence or carelessness."' 125 These articles
state basic principles of the general law and are applicable to ISPs. 1 26 In
particular, article 1382 applies to Internet Access Providers and article
1383 best applies to ISPs. 12 7 In Lacoste, the TGI of Nanterre based the
quasi-editorial duties of ISPs on article 1383 of the French Civil Code; the
118. Id. at 921-22.
119. Id. at 922.
120. 239 F.3d at 1024.
121. Droit commun in French.
122. See generally Thoumyre, supra note 13.
123. Lefibure v. Lacambre, TGI Paris, June 9, 1998, at http://www.legalis.net/cgi-
iddn/french/affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=internet responsabilite.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2001); accord Lacoste v. Societe Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 1999, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry.
124. CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1382 (Fr.) ("Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause a
autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, a le rtparer.").
125. C. civ. art. 1383 (Fr.) ("Chacun est responsable du dommage qu'il a cause non
seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa negligence ou par son imprudence.").
126. Thoumyre, supra note 13.
127. Other solutions could be based on Articles 1384 through 1386 of the French
Civil Code relating to the liability for other persons, things or animals under one's
supervision or guardianship.
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court merely put ISPs' obligations of vigilance, action and information
under the scope of the droit commun.1 28 The application of this solution
might entail an obligation of inspection rather than of vigilance, which
would expand the duties of ISPs and seriously burden their tasks. 129 The
Cour d'Appel of Versailles seemingly limited this requirement. 130 Referring
to the Cour d'Appel, the control of the contents does not need to be system-
atic. The ISP will have to operate this check spontaneously only in case it
has actual knowledge or is informed of the illicit content of a Web site or
when the ISP comes to suspect illegality of content while performing its
ordinary tasks on the Web site at stake.1 3 ' This attitude amounts to the
controversial and yet vague diligences appropiees13 2 that might lead an ISP
to shut down an illicit Web site. 13 3 This type of liability based on the gen-
eral law is added to the ISP's editorial liability, leaving its legal status
unclear.134
French courts had already found liability for copyright infringements
on the Internet. However, those decisions only concerned the direct liabil-
ity of subscribers and did not concern ISPs.13 5 In 1999, the Tribunal de
Commerce of Paris refused to hold APs liable for the copyright infringe-
ments found on a Web site they only provided an hyperlink to, without
providing any further services to the direct infringers.13 6 In 2000, the TGI
of Paris found liable under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code a hosting
service provider (hebergeur) for the copyright infringements of a sub-
128. Lacoste v. Societe Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 1999, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry. Droit Commun is the general law applicable to any-
body (save if people fall under a clearly defined exception).
129. Id. (holding that defendant ISP should have used a research engine based on a
limited number of key words that evoke, for example, the universe of nudity, beauty, and
fame to notify the author of the infringements, or even to strike down the apparently
illegal Web site.).
130. Soci~t6 Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Versailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000, IR
270, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/urisfr/img/caversailles200006O8.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
131. Id.
132. Roughly translated as "proper remedial actions".
133. Thoumyre, supra note 13, at 4-5.
134. Thoumyre, supra note 36.
135. Art Music v. ENST, TGI Paris, Aug. 14, 1996 (holding two students liable under
copyright law because they had posted copyrighted works of singers Brel and Sardou on
their personal Web pages), at http://www.celoq.fr/expertises/refere.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2001); accord Queneau v. Leroy, TGI Paris, May 5, 1997, J.C.P. 1997, II, 22906
(holding liable under copyright law the author of a Web site who had made available
online a copyrighted text of R. Queneau), available at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/deci-
sions/dt-auteur/ord_0597.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001); SNC Prisma Press v. Vidal,
TGI Paris, Feb. 13, 2001 (holding liable the authors of Web pages who had reproduced
copyrighted articles of French magazines), available at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/deci-
sions/dtauteur/jug tgiparis 130201.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
136. Groupe Revue Fiduciaire v. EDV, T. Com. Paris, Jan. 1, 1999 (holding that the
defendants-lAPs were not liable for the unlicensed reproduction of copyrighted articles
found on a Web site they provided an hyperlink to), at http://www.afa-France.com/htm/
action/jugement2.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
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scriber. 13 7 The court decided that the defendant-ISP could not have
ignored that the domain name and the Internet address of its subscriber
were mere reproductions of the notorious Calimero trademark when it
accepted to host the Web site. 138 In this case, the court considered that the
ISP had the ability to decide not to host a clearly infringing Web site from
the outset and nonetheless accepted to host the Web site at stake, thus
allowing a subscriber to pursue its on-line infringement. Therefore, the
holding of this case is limited to specific facts when the ISP actually and
knowingly decides to provide the facilities for the infringing activity.
Finally, in 2001, the TGI of Paris had again an opportunity to assess
the liability of an ISP for the copyright infringement of a subscriber. In
Perathoner v. Pomier, Joseph Pomier, the subscriber, posted a recording of
the copyrighted musical work Ushuaia on his Web site. 139 The court
refused to hold the ISP liable under Article 1384 of the French Civil Code,
as it determined that neither was Free (the ISP) the guardian of the com-
puters on which the data that allowed the infringement to take place were
stored, nor had Free the direction, use or control over the Web site at
stake. 140 In this case, Free did not act as a hosting service provider; it only
provided an hyperlink to the infringing Web site and nothing more. 14 1
Then, the court focused on whether Free had been at fault for imprudence
to explore its potential liability under Article 1382 and 1383 of the French
Civil Code. 14 2 The court found that Free had warned its subscriber that
some data transmitted via the Internet may be copyrighted when they
entered their contractual relationship, and that Free had also promptly
removed access to the infringing Web site once on notice of infringe-
ment. 14 3 Thus, referring to this holding, an ISP escapes liability for its
subscribers' wrongs when it: (1) acts cautiously with its subscribers by
informing them of the risks of copyright infringement on the Internet and,
(2) promptly removes access to infringing Web sites once on notice of
infringement. This 'standard of cautiousness' is not detailed in the court's
decision. Moreover, under the facts of this case, this holding may well
apply only to IAPs, as the defendant only provided an hyperlink to the
infringing Web site.
137. Cons. P. v. Monsieur G., TGI Paris, Mar. 24, 2000, Gaz.Pal., no. 21, at 42-43, note
Matthyssens (2001) (holding that even though there is no presumption that the ISP
knows the content of all the Web sites it hosts, under the facts of the case, the defendant-
ISP could not ignore the copyright infringements of its subscriber), at http://juris-
com.net/cgi-iddn/french/affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=internetdtauteur.htm (last visited Sept.
6, 2001).
138. Id.
139. Perathoner v. Pomier, TGI Paris, May 23, 2001, available at http://
www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/dt-auteur/jug-tgi-paris_230501.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2001). Note that the court held that the French law on ISP liability enacted in August
1, 2000 and the European Union Directive on E-commerce of June 8, 2000 were not
applicable. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Under this case law, it is unclear how a French court would decide a
case like Napster. A court would certainly find Napster's users liable under
French copyright law. 144 However, no French court held an ISP liable for
the acts of its users without finding a fault or imprudence of the ISP itself.
Under the facts of Napster, a French court should explore liability of the
ISP under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. Referring to Cons. P. v.
Monsieur G. and the specific technology and software that Napster devel-
oped to share audio recordings on the Internet, a French court might find
Napster liable for continuing to provide the facilities to users although it
had actual knowledge of specific infringements. The "cautiousness
approach" found in Perathoner v. Pomier offers another possibility to find
Napster liable, as a plaintiff had put Napster on notice of various and spe-
cific infringements, and still Napster did nothing to remove access to the
infringing files. Of course, those cases have no binding authority in France
and the likely solution there is far from certain.
b. The Still Unexplored Application of Penal Complicity to ISPs
An ISP could also fall under the provisions of the French Penal Code that
deal with complicity. 14 5 Article 121-7 states that "a person who knowingly
facilitates the preparation or the realization of a crime or of a tort, by pro-
viding her help or assistance, is an accomplice for this crime or tort."'1 46
Article 121-6 provides that the accomplice is to be punished as author of
the wrong. 147 In the case of a pure Internet Access Provider, however, its
participation is not material to the infraction (as it provides a connection
to its subscribers, not to the direct infringer), and it does not necessarily
have the requisite mens rea 148 (either if it is not aware of the wrong or, if
aware, if it does not have the technology to stop the display of the illicit
content). 149 In the case of an ISP, the mere supply of a space to upload
information might qualify as participation to the infraction. 150 The
remaining question is then the existence of the requisite mens rea of ISPs.
ISPs' subscribers can modify the contents posted without any intervention
of the former and are not required to inform them of these operations.' 15
Therefore, ISPs might not be aware of illicit contents posted by their sub-
scribers. The only hypothesis in which the ISP could have the requisite
144. Under Article 122-4 of the Intellectual Property Code of France (Code de la
Propriett Intellectuelle) any performance or reproduction, partial or in its integrity, of a
protected work without the consent of the author is illegal. CODE DE LA PROPRItTt INTEL-
LECTUELLE art. 122-4 (Fr.).
145. See Sebastien Canevet, Fourniture d'acces d l'Internet et responsabilite penale, at
http://www.canevet.com/doctrine/resp-fai.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
146. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 121-7 (Fr.) (providing that "[olne should be deemed an
accomplice to a crime or delict when one knowingly, by help or assistance, facilitated its
preparation or accomplishment.").
147. C. PEN. art. 121-6 (Fr.) (providing that "an accomplice to the crime or delict
under article 121-7 should be punished as the author of the crime or delict").
148. That is to say the requisite state of the mind under the penal law.
149. Canevet, supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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mens rea is when it is aware of an infraction that persists (infraction
continue).152
Obviously, each country developed independent case law solutions
that look similar. Among the numerous actors 153 that intervene on the
Internet, U.S. and French courts chose to single out ISPs and tailored stan-
dards to assess their liability; courts sometimes went further and defined
affirmative duties for ISPs.154 This common approach also characterizes
the French and U.S. statutory framework. In this respect, however, similar-
ity derives from interesting direct and indirect interrelations.
II. Interrelated Developments of Similar Statutory Solutions
To understand the reasons that led to similar statutory solutions, it is nec-
essary to realize that both the French and the U.S. legislatures started at
the same point. In each country, the case law had autonomously devel-
oped similar analysis of ISP liability, as presented above. This section ana-
lyzes the common underlying factors that led U.S. and French judges to the
same solutions. This section also attempts to determine why the legisla-
tures reacted the same way in both countries.
A. Autonomous Developments and Common Underlying Factors
1. The Efficiency Argument
A common focus on ISPs is a consequence both of a general policy choice
and of the courts' interpretation of ISPs' position among Internet actors.
The general policy choice is one of efficiency since it is reasonably foresee-
able that a liability regime should provide ISPs with an incentive for screen-
ing content, or to provide their subscribers with technical tools to do so, to
avoid liability. 15 5 The Internet has lowered the cost and traditional physi-
cal burden, in terms of necessary facilities, of copying. It has also allowed
wrongdoers to be mobile and hard to locate.' 5 6 Thus, it is easier to locate
and hold ISPs liable for defamation and copyright infringement than to do
so for other actors.' 5 7 One commentator believes that the courts have been
sensitive to plaintiffs who stated that ISPs were the "deep pockets" and that
152. Id.
153. For a general presentation of the actors and wrongs found on the Internet, see
generally Strowel & Ide, supra note 2, at 25-32.
154. For France, see Halliday v. Lacambre CA Paris, 14e ch., Feb. 10, 1999, D. 1999,
jur. 389, note N. Mallet-Poujol, available at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/illic-
ite divers/ca_100299.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001). See also Lacoste v. SocitI Mul-
timania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 2000, 11, 10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry.
For the U.S., see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Serv., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that ISPs have an obligation to check the
existence of a copyright notice in the caption of images posted on the Internet in order
to escape liability).
155. For instance, the U.S. legislature affirmed that it was aiming at "removiing] dis-
incentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate
online material." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (1996).
156. Rojas, supra note 5, at 1016-17.
157. Id.
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where innocent parties were involved, the one who best could prevent the
wrong should bear the consequences.' 58
In France, under some circumstances, judges have implicitly consid-
ered ISPs as being in the best position to know the identity of the direct
author of the wrong. 15 9 The Cour d'Appel of Versailles gave some guide-
lines for ISPs to comply with their obligations to implement preventive mea-
sures; one of these concerned the prohibition of non-identification while
contracting with Web pages editors.160 The TGI of Nanterre implicitly
noted the privileged position of IAPs to ascertain the actual identity of a
Web site editor. 161 This proposal is linked to the courts' functional analy-
sis since the TGI scrutinized the nature of the functions and ability of the
ISP at stake.162 Courts conclude that ISPs have technical means to prevent
and stop on-line wrongs. In both the United States and in France, given
this understanding of ISPs' technical ability and their relation to potential
direct infringers, imposing liability on ISPs is considered efficient as an
incentive to make them screen content. 163
158. Melone, supra note 50, at 495.
159. Lacoste v. Sociwt Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 2000, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry (stating that the assessment of ISPs liability is indepen-
dent of the presence of the editor of the Web site as a party to the suit and that the
defendant-ISP could have obtained the information necessary to the identification of the
editor from the IAP). Interestingly, the French legislature tried to improve the availabil-
ity of data regarding the identity of any person involved in the creation of online content.
It imposed ISPs an obligation to collect and to disclose those data to the judiciary, if
necessary. Professionals who publish online content also have the duty to make availa-
ble to the public elements of identification concerning themselves and the ones in
charge of the online publication content. However, the French Conseil Constitutionnel
struck down provisions relating to ISPs duties to remove content once a third-party puts
them on notice of the illegality of this content. Law No. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000,
arts. 43-7, 43-8, 43-9, 43-10, J.O., August 2, 2000, p. 11903; JCP 2000, Aper~u Rapide,
1739; see also Cons. const. No. 2000-433 DC of July 27, 2000, J.O., August 2, 2000, p.
11903; JCP 2000, Aper u Rapide, 1739 (invalidating certain provisions of the above
mentioned law).
160. Soci&t Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Versailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000, IR
270, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/img/caversailles200006O8.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
161. Union des EtudiantsJuifs de France v. Multimania, TGI Nanterre, May 22, 2000
(stating an ISP that provides space can have the adequate IAP communicate the actual
identity of its client), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgparis20000522.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
162. Id.
163. On economic grounds, a counterargument would be that imposing liability on
ISPs might raise litigation and transaction costs, and thus deter new ISP entrants and
make the existing ISPs increase their rates to pass the new costs to their subscribers.
However, the deterrence argument lacks foundation if there is no showing of a cost-
benefit analysis that would lead to the doubtful conclusion that new costs supersede any
opportunity of profits. Moreover, if the market for ISPs is a competitive one, ISPs cannot
transfer their new costs to their subscribers, or at least not in their entirety, as subscrib-
ers would go to cheaper competitors. Finally, ISPs can also spread the risk of financial
loss thanks to insurance funds. These arguments and counterarguments are also classi-
cally found in the area of product liability.
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2. The Technical Issue
The courts' functional analysis naturally focused on the ISP's technical
means that would make it possible to implement case law solutions and
courts' orders. In Lacoste, the TGI of Nanterre noted that ISPs could use
search engines and keywords to detect suspect contents. 164 On detection
of such contents, the TGI stated that ISPs could and should notify the
author of the allegedly wrong content and even shut down the Web site if
necessary.' 65 On appeal, the Cour d'Appel of Versailles confirmed the
lower court's decision and further noted that ISPs are able and ought to
locate illicit contents to cause their modification or to stop providing their
services, if necessary, at the time of performing their contractual
obligations. 166
In the U.S., the Religious Technology court also stated that ISPs could
and should operate some verification.1 6 7 However, whether or not ISPs are
able to monitor illicit contents and determine if suspected works amount to
infringements, 168 judges, both in France and in the U.S., might overstate
ISPs' technical screening abilities.16 9 This common focus on ISPs led the
French and the U.S. courts to develop a similar standard of assessment for
ISP liability based on ISPs' technical ability and good faith in using their
tools to screen content.
3. Common Weaknesses in Assessing ISP Liability
In both the United States and France, courts developed standards of assess-
ment that share common characteristics: theoretical vagueness and practi-
cal weaknesses. 170 They also trigger common challenges for ISPs in both
countries. In France, the legal scheme fluctuates between a principle of no
liability for ISPs, a presumption of liability, and the usual civil liability
164. Lacoste v. Societt Multimania, TGI Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 2000, II,
10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/img/
caversailles20000608.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
165. Id.
166. Id. (stating that the ISP who provides space has an obligation to locate any sites
whose content is illegal, illicit or damaging in order to cause the putting in order of the
content or to stop the providing of his services).
167. Weiskopf, supra note 5, at 29 (stating that courts found it fair "to impose some
level of affirmative verification of the infringing activity on the defendant where facts -
like works containing copyright notices posted to the defendant's system - exist, giving
rise to a reasonable ability to verify the alleged infringing activity.").
168. Canevet, supra note 145 (stating that once an LAP opens a domain for one of his
clients, this client is able to freely add, modify, suppress information without notifying
the LAP); see also Melone, supra note 50, at 497 (stating that "[tihe access provider who
provides the gateway to thousands of bulletin board operators, and thus millions of cus-
tomers, to upload, download, or simply view the infringing material, is only tangentially
related to any resulting copyright infringements."); Yen, supra note 81, at 1871 (stating
that the volume of traffic will make careful consideration of potential infringements a
practical impossibility, and that it is hard to determine whether there is infringement or
not).
169. Luftman, supra note 12, at 1098 (commenting on Stratton, and noting that Strat-
ton court "failed to identify the limited capabilities of Prodigy's [defendant-ISP] screen-
ing software.").
170. See supra Part I.
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found in droit commun.17 1 In the U.S., depending on whether it earns reve-
nue from a subscriber's infringement, to what degree it has knowledge of
an infringing activity or to what degree it exercises a control over the con-
tents, an ISP is at risk of being held liable. 172 In France, legal decisions
still fail to determine a clear standard of assessment and the available deci-
sions do not generally adopt a single clear-cut legal rationale. 173 Both in
France and in the U.S., courts drew analogies between ISPs and traditional
media actors that led to similar standards of assessment of ISP liability. 174
In both countries ISPs have an editorial liability that is in correlation with
the level of editorial control they exercise. 175 In both countries they are
liable if they fail to exercise some affirmative verifications upon notice of
infringement, or when they have reason to suspect an infringement. 176
Thus, U.S. and French courts use similar legal principles and legal analysis
to hold ISPs liable. French courts, however, went further in their definition
of ISPs' affirmative duties and U.S. courts are ahead in defining ISP liability
for third party wrongs.
Despite this apparent international harmonization, on a national level,
the contradictory case law outcomes left ISPs uncertain as to the risks relat-
ing to their function. Uncertainty and its foreseeable consequences have
provided incentives to the legislatures, both in the United States and in
France, to implement statutes and regulations determining the conditions
under which an ISP is and is not liable. 177 Noticeably, these similar solu-
tions derive from common weaknesses. Therefore it is important to con-
sider what factors led to these similar case law developments both in
France and in the United States.
171. F. Olivier and E. Barbry, Note, Responsabilite sur Internet: le droit commun, encore
et toujours!, JCP 11 10279 (1999).
172. Yen, supra note 81, at 1880-81 (providing a summary of the underlying law on
copyright infringement); see also Rojas, supra note 5, at 1034-35 (stating that a negli-
gence standard of liability for ISPs is emerging that focuses on the reasonableness of
ISPs' actions once on notice of infringement); Luftman, supra note 12, at 1092-93 (on
the consistency of current online defamation law).
173. Thoumyre, supra note 36.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra Part I.A; see also Goldstein, supra note 23, at 629 (stating that "[als a
result of Cubby, it appears that BBS operators and OSPs [On-Line Service Providers] can
choose their liability by choosing the amount of editorial control that they wish to
exercise.").
176. Melone, supra note 50, at 499 (noting that courts use this standard for copyright
infringement); see also Rojas, supra note 5, at 1019 (stating that the "greatest risk for an
ISP for defamation liability for third-party content will continue to be in cases where
deletion of an offending message is demanded but the ISP refuses to comply."). For
France, see Soci&t Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Versailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000,
IR 270.
177. For France, see Law No. 2000-719 of Aug. 1, 2000, J.O., Aug. 2, 2000, p. 11903
(modifying the Law No. 86-1067 of Sept. 30, 1986 On the Freedom of Communication).
In the U.S., see 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) and 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
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B. Reactive Enactments to the Case Law
1. Freedom of Speech and Liberte d'Expression Concerns
Both in the U.S. and in France commentators have stressed the dangers of
requiring technical intermediaries to exercise screening for content. ISPs
could either try to escape any affirmative duties or exercise a precautionary
censorship that would in turn possibly trigger their liability on free speech
grounds.
Given the prevailing case law in the U.S., an ISP should charge a flat
fee to its subscribers to safely avoid liability for its subscriber's copyright
infringements and avoid any screening of content whatsoever. 178 In con-
trast, when an ISP receives a notice of infringement, it has strong incentives
to suspend its services to escape liability, which might lead to censor-
ship. 179 Moreover, a liability based on whether or not an ISP received noti-
fication 18 0 of an alleged wrong may be "a disincentive to engage in self-
regulation of content available on [ISPs'] services, because doing so might
well provide a would-be plaintiff with a basis to claim that [ISPs] knew or
should have known that particular content was tortious."18 1 This kind of
attitude has far-reaching implications for Free Speech matters and could
further ISPs' liability in case they unduly burden free expression by remov-
ing access to Web sites as a precautionary measure. 18 2
French commentators expressed similar concerns and argued that the
law should not require ISPs to manage editorial tasks that might convert
their laudable vigilance into censorship. 18 3 In Lacoste, the Cour d'Appel of
Versailles warned that ISPs' incompetence to determine whether or not
contents are illegal and the danger that ISPs abuse their right to screen
content (abus de droit)18 4 should limit their editorial-like affirmative
duties.' 8 5 The court also noted that a systematic control by ISPs over the
178. Yen, supra note 81, at 1880-81.
179. PatrickJ. Carome & Samir Jain, Immunity From Tort Liability for Online Services:
Why the Decision in Zeran v. America Online is Good Public Policy, 2 CYBERSPACE LAW. 13,
14 (1998) (stating that "imposing liability on interactive service providers for third-
party content ... would, as a practical matter, compel service providers to err on the
side of censorship.").
180. Notification has here a broad meaning. ISPs may be notified of defamatory or
other tortuous content by conducting their own inquiry, by receiving notification from a
third-party, or simply by chance. Id.
181. Carome &Jain, supra note 179, at 14.
182. Yen, supra note 81, at 1869-72; see also French Senator Ivan Renan, Address
before the French Senat (May 29 and June 27, 2000) (fearing an a priori censorship over
content), available at http://Senat.fr/sances/s20000627/s20000627_mono.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2000); French Senator Pierre Hrisson, Address before the French Senat
(May 29 and June 27, 2000) (stating that ISPs can be held liable for unduly shutting
down a Web site), available at http://Senat.fr, Compte rendu de seance File (last visited
10 Oct. 2000).
183. Thoumyre, supra note 13.
184. This civil law notion refers to a fault that consists in exercising one's right not in
furtherance of one's interest but rather in an attempt to harm someone else.
185. Socite Multimania v. Lacoste, CA Versailles, 12e ch., June 8, 2000, D. 2000, IR
270, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/urisfr/img/caversailles200006O8.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
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contents may alter the freedom of speech, of creation and of communica-
tion.186 The legislatures also had to tackle the issue of the uncertainty of
the case law.
2. Legislatures' Concerns with Case Law Uncertainties
Legislators had to clear uncertainties arising out of the analogies between
ISPs and publishers or distributors, and regarding ISP liability for the acts
of third parties. In France, Member of Parliament (depute) Bloche who pro-
posed new enactments on ISP liability made it clear that the controversial
case Halliday v. Lacambre'8 7 triggered his legislative action.' 88 Depute
Bloche also stressed that the new law would seek to avoid the uncertainty
that arose out the case law.189 Furthermore, business concerns also moti-
vated the French government's attempt to favor investment in new technol-
ogies. 190 Therefore, three factors influenced the French legislative action:
uncertainty of the case law on ISP liability, free speech issues and protec-
tion of the public, 191 and business concerns. These factors also influenced
the U.S. legislative action. For instance, the U.S. legislature emphasized
that the policy of the United States was:
[T]o encourage the development of technologies which maximize user con-
trol over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; ... to ensure
vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish traffick-
ing in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
19 2
These factors gave incentives to the legislatures to water down ISP lia-
bility under certain conditions.
C. The U.S. and French Statutory Frameworks: Evolution and
Comparison
The U.S. framework is a dual one since two different acts govern on the
one hand defamation, and on the other hand copyright infringement.
186. Id.
187. Halliday v. Lacambre, CA Paris, 14e ch., Feb. 10, 1999, D. 1999, jur. 389, note N.
Mallet-Poujol, available at http://www.legalis.net/jnet/decisions/illicitedivers/ca_
100299.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
188. Member of Parliament Bloche, Address before the French Assemblee Nationale,
J.O., June 15, 2000, p, 5471, available at http://Assembl~e-nationale.fr, Compte rendu
de stance File (last visited Oct. 10, 2000).
189. Id.
190. French Secretary of State for Culture and Communication Catherine Tasca,
Address before the French Stnat, supra note 182.
191. In particular for defamatory materials, child pornography or other contents
endangering public order (ordre public).
192. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), (5) (1996).
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1. The Communication Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act
a. ISP Liability Under Defamation Law and for Indecent and Obscene
Content
In the U.S., Congress first tackled the issue of ISP liability under defama-
tion law. The case law had been analogizing ISPs sometimes to publishers
and sometimes to distributors, which led to inconsistent results as to their
liability. 19 3 The Communication Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) provided a
clear rule by rejecting the publisher-type liability: "No provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider." 194
The Fourth Circuit upheld this approach in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,
when the Court stated that it could not hold ISPs to the same standards as
publishers for an alleged failure to exercise traditional functions "such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content."'19 5 The
Fourth Circuit recognized a congressional intent to preserve free speech on
the Internet and Congress' choice of the Cubby' 9 6 solution over the one
developed in Stratton.197 Courts could, however, still hold liable ISPs that
knowingly distributed defamatory content. 198 Again, the CDA provides for
a limitation of liability if an ISP took actions "in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or other-
wise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally pro-
tected."' 199 Therefore, the CDA resolved the judicial uncertainty regarding
ISP editorial liability for defamatory content.
The CDA also clearly targeted indecent, obscene material and pornog-
raphy on the Internet. The Act targeted transmission and creation of
obscene or indecent material knowingly directed to a recipient who is
under eighteen years old.200 The mere act of permitting the use of a tele-
communication facility under one's control for purposes of transmitting
obscene or indecent content may entail liability. 20 1 The Act also states that
193. See supra Part l.A.
194. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
195. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997). Other courts
have followed this approach. Accord Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (holding that 47 U.S.C. § 230 created a federal immunity for ISPs); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that
America Online was immune from liability for third party's content under 47 U.S.C.
§ 230).
196. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
197. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Med. L. Rptr. 1794 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1995); see also Carome & Jain, supra note 179 (commenting on Zeran and stating
that Congress directly intended to overrule Stratton to provide ISPs with a federal immu-
nity); Rojas, supra note 5, at 1017-18 (commenting on Zeran and Congress' "anti-Strat-
ton" provisions).
198. Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 426.
199. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2) (1996).
200. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(1)(A)-(B) (1996).
201. Id. § 223 (a)(2).
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an ISP is to be held to the same standard of liability as a publisher for this
kind of communications. 20 2 However, the Supreme Court found that the
provisions concerning indecency were too vague under the protection
offered by the First Amendment. 20 3 In response, Congress enacted the
Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA), to prevent transmission of
material "harmful to minors" for commercial purposes.20 4 Again, the con-
stitutionality of certain restrictive provisions of COPA is questionable, as it
would oblige ISPs to comply with the most restrictive community's stan-
dards amongst those of communities from which users could access the
potentially harmful online content. 205 Moreover, courts have found that it
was technically difficult to restrict access to specific users or members of a
specific community. 20 6 Thus, in the area of indecent content the standard
of liability is not clearly established yet.
b. ISP Liability Under Copyright Law
Congress also tackled the issue of ISP 20 7 liability for third-party's copy-
right infringements. 208 Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) limits ISP liability for copyright infringement in the context of
transitory digital network communications, 20 9 system caching to provide
quick and easy access to users,210 data stored for the benefit of users,211
and providing information location tools that allow users to consult
infringing materials. 212 In summary, although it does not affect the com-
mon law principles for copyright infringement, the DMCA creates safe
harbors for ISPs unaware of the presence of infringing material and ready
to remove or disable access to the material on notice of infringement. 213
Title 17 of the United States Code eliminates direct liability for ISPs
which implement measures to terminate repeat infringers and provisional
technical measures to protect copyrighted works. 214 Title 17 also directly
addresses the issue of contributory and vicarious liability and creates a
202. See id. § 230(e)(1).
203. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
204. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (1996).
205. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 614-24.
206. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd, 194 F.3d 1149 (3d Cir.
2000).
207. Under the Act, "service provider" has a broad definition, as it means "a provider
of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities." 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(k)(1)(B) (1998).
208. For a detailed summary of the safe harbors, see Cunard et al., supra note 8, at
390-96. For a summary of the recent legislative history, see Weiskopf, supra note 5, at
49-53.
209. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1998).
210. Id. § 512(b).
211. Id. § 512(c).
212. Id. § 512(d).
213. For a clear and concise summary of the different conditions required to benefit
from the safe harbor scheme, see Berschadsky, supra note 9, at 768-70. See also Ballon
& Kupferschmid, supra note 61. For an overview of both the Communication Decency
Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, see Strowel & Ide, supra note 2, at 49-62.
214. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (1998).
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safe harbor for ISPs. 215 This section uses a set of case law solutions: ISPs
must not have actual knowledge 2 16 of the infringing activity and the mate-
rial must not be infringing on its face;2 17 ISPs must not get any direct
financial gain from the infringing activity; 218 ISPs must remove or disable
access to the infringing work once they gain knowledge of infringement
2 19
or once they are put on notice of infringement.2 20 Noticeably, this section
provides procedures ISPs must follow to ease the receipt of notice of
infringement 22 1 and to process these claims. 222 By the same token, it
makes clear the kind of notice that could trigger ISPs' liability if they do not
act with promptness. 22 3 Moreover, under the Act, an ISP that wrongfully
removes content after it is put on notice of infringement by a third party is
not liable so long as it notified its subscribers of the removal. 224
Therefore, the DMCA uses case law solutions to create safe harbors for
ISPs, which provides them with more legal certainty. 22 5 The legislative his-
tory clearly points out the legislature's attempt to clarify the relevant case
law.22 6 Title I of the DMCA "codifies the core of current case law dealing
with the liability of on-line service providers, while narrowing and clarify-
ing the law in other respects. ' 227 For instance, the Act creates a safe har-
bor for temporary copies of e-mails that are automatically created on
servers for purposes of transmission.2 28 So long as the ISP respects the
conditions set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), there is no liability for monetary
relief under the Copyright Act even though the copies at stake concern
215. However, the statute's articulation of the vicarious liability for ISPs and its artic-
ulation with the safe harbor provided for in 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(1)(B) is unclear, as courts
have not yet defined the level of control that is sufficient to find an ISP vicariously liable.
Wright, supra note 83, at 1027-36 (arguing that the direct-control approach is the best
way to leave some leeway to ISPs to monitor content without depriving them of the safe
harbor provisions).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) (1998).
217. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
218. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
219. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
220. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
221. Id. § 512(c)(2) (requiring the designation of an agent to receive claims of alleged
infringements).
222. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C), (c)(3)(B)(ii), (d)(3), (f).
223. Yen, supra note 81, at 1884-87.
224. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
225. However, the DMCA might not remove the case law incentives for ISPs to unduly
affect Free Speech. Yen, supra note 81, at 1888-89 (stating that the Act creates bad First
Amendment effects because: (1) "it ossifies and perpetuates ambiguities in existing law
that encourage ISPs to indiscriminately remove material from the Internet;" (2) it
"increases the incentive for indiscriminate removal of material by protecting ISPs from
actions by their subscribers;" (3) it "exacerbates the effect of any mistaken action against
speech by effectively circumventing the procedures that would normally protect a copy-
right defendant from unjustified curtailment of her free speech rights.").
226. COBLE, WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATIES IMPLEMENTATION AND ON-LINE COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY LIMITATION, H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1 (1998).
227. Id. at 11 (making straightforward references to Religious Technology and Frena
and stressing in which respects the bill overrules or departs from those cases).
228. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1998).
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infringing materials that users have sent. 229 Internal and external factors
have pushed the French legal framework closer to the American one. This
trend, however, cannot go as far as uniformity since legal and political
endemic factors are and will be at play in France.
2. French Enactments and Comparison to the U.S. Legislation
a. Evolution
In France, the first attempt to limit ISP liability by statute dates back to
1996. The French Secretary of State for Postal Services and Telecommuni-
cation introduced a bill that provided an insulation from penal liability for
ISPs that gave a screening software to their subscribers and disabled access
to illegal content on notice from the Comite Superieur de la Teltmatique, an
administrative body.230 This bill purported to create a presumption of lia-
bility and a safe harbor in case of compliance to orders of the Comite Super-
ieur de la Tlematique.2 3 1 In June 1999, the French Chamber of
Representatives (Assemblee Nationale) adopted a new bill that greatly lim-
ited ISPs' liability: the Amendement Bloche. The final bill, adopted by both
the French Senate and the French Chamber of Representatives slightly nar-
rowed ISPs' safe harbor; as explained later, the French Conseil Constitution-
nel also censored part of the bill.232 Both domestic and international
influences have driven the French legislature to this solution.
b. Domestic and International Influences
The French case law, the American DMCA, and the European Directive of
June 8, 2000 on the information society and electronic commerce signifi-
cantly influenced the dispositions of this bill.23 3 The European directive is
very similar to the U.S. DMCA, but its scope is broader as it is not limited
to copyright. 234 It creates safe harbors for ISPs under the same conditions
as the DMCA 235 and draws the same functional distinctions regarding
mere conduit, caching and storage of data dedicated to users.236 The
229. Id.; see also Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 391-92.
230. Thoumyre, supra note 36.
231. Id.
232. Law No. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000, Art. 43-8, J.O., August 2, 2000, p. 11903.
233. Member of Parliament Pierre Bloche, Address to the French Assemble Nationale,
supra note 188 (citing Lacoste); see also Senators Pierre Hrisson, Alain Joyandet and
Michel Pelchet, Address before the French Senat, supra note 182 (making references to
the U.S. DMCA notification procedures); French Secretary of State Catherine Tasca and
Senator Pierre H~risson, Address before the French Snat, supra note 182 (making refer-
ence to the European Directive on Electronic Commerce).
234. European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on cer-
tain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in particular Electronic Commerce in
the Internal Market, art. 15, 2000 Oj. (L 178), 1, 13 [hereinafter Directive on E-Com-
merce]. The Directive sometimes uses the exact same terms as the DMCA. For a com-
parison of both texts, see S~dallian, supra note 14. For an overview of the European
Union law that deals with online copyright infringement, see Strowel & Ide, supra note
2, at 63-83.
235. Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 234.
236. Id. at Chapter I, art. 12-14.
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directive, however, does not provide for notification procedures. 23 7 Article
15 of the directive states that ISPs have no general obligation to check the
content of the information they transmit or store, if they did not create or
modify it.2
38
These underlying factors that influenced the French legislature help
the understanding of the similarity of the French and American statutory
solutions. Those factors, however, also explain why those frameworks can-
not provide identical solutions.
c. The Asymptotic Convergence of French and U.S. Legislation
Not surprisingly, the French Amendement Bloche repeats some of the gen-
eral principles found in the DMCA: no presumption of liability of ISPs and
safe harbor in case ISPs act expeditiously once on notice of illicit con-
tent.23 9 The newly enacted amendment reads as follows:
Physical or moral persons who provide, gratuitously or for profits, perma-
nent and direct storage for putting signals, writings, images, sounds or
messages of whatever nature to the public's disposal, may be liable under
civil or penal law for the content of these services only if once notified by a
judiciary authority, they did not promptly acted to stop the access to this
content.
2 40
237. Rojinsky, supra note 12 (commenting on these differences and stating that the
lack of provisions concerning notification procedures in the E.U. Directive amounts to a
lack of safeguards for Free Speech matters).
238. Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 234.
239. Law no. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000 modifying Law no. 86-1067 of September
30, 1986, art. 43-8 (the obligation to act only arises when the judicial authority issues a
notification). The French law also requires ISPs to gather information that would allow
the actual identification of the people who contributed to the creation of any content.
Id. arts. 43-9, 43-10. Note that the TGI of Paris was the first court to apply those provi-
sions and found that an ISP was not liable for defamatory or infringing content posted
by its subscribers when the ISP provided the plaintiff with sufficient information to
identify the authors of the Web site at stake. SARL One Tel v. SA Multimania, TGI Paris,
Sept. 20, 2000, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis
20000920.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001). For an interesting and comprehensive history
of the modifications of the Amendement Bloche during the legislative debates both before
the French Senat and the French Assemblke Nationale, see Responsabilite des Acteurs de
L'Internet, Loi sur la Communication audiovisuelle modifiant la loi du 30/09/1986, at
http://www.legalis.net/jnet/2000/loi-audio/projetloi3.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001).
For analyses on the Amendement Bloche, see Joel Heslaut, Acteurs de l'Internet, Respon-
sables mais pas Coupables [Internet Actors, Responsible but not Guilty], LES PETITES
AFFICHES, no. 177, at 4 (Sept. 5, 2000). See also Alain Bensoussan and Pierre Noguier,
Hebergeur de contenu: Irresponsabilitg Actuelle/Responsabilite Virtuelle? [Hosting Service
Providers: Actual Irresponsibility/Virtual Responsibility?], Gaz. Pal. 2000, no. 301-302,
at 26; Fredfric-Jr6me Pansier and Emmanuel Jez, La Responsabilite des Hebergeurs a
l'Aune de la Loi du ler Aofit 2000 - Bilan Acquis Jurisprudentiels et d'une Reforme Legisla-
tive Amputee, Gaz. Pal. 2000, no. 252-253, at 19.
240. Law No. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000, art. 43-8,J.O., Aug. 2, 2000, p. 11903;JCP
2000, III, Apercu Rapide, 1739. Note that this provision expressly applies to hosting
service providers (hebergeurs) that store and process data for subscribers. Another pro-
vision defines affirmative, and limited duties of IAPs. Under article 43-7, IAPs that pro-
vide access to services which include more than mere tools for private correspondence,
must disclose to their subscribers the means available to restrict access to certain ser-
vices or to select services, and must also propose to their subscribers at least one of
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Referring to the legislative debates, "acting promptly" is tantamount to
the notion of "diligences approprides" already used by French judges.2 4 1
This requirement is also found in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) that provides for a
safe harbor for infringing content uploaded on an ISP's server: once it
obtains knowledge, is aware of suspect circumstances, or is put on notice,
an ISP must act expeditiously to remove access to the infringing content to
qualify for the safe harbor. 24 2 The French Secretary of State of Culture and
Telecommunication defined this notion as ISPs' obligations to check the
presence of an allegedly illegal content, inform the author and the damaged
party of available procedures, or even disable access to the infringing mate-
rial under certain circumstances. 24 3
Moreover, according to European Union law, EU directives must be
made applicable (transposee) under French national laws.2 44 IAPs, how-
ever, are still subject to the French general law24 5 and the EU directive does
not "affect the possibility of injunctions" like "orders by courts or adminis-
trative authorities requiring the termination or prevention of any infringe-
ment, including removal of illegal information or disabling of access to
it."'2 4 6 The directive does not forbid monitoring obligations imposed by
orders of national authorities in accordance with national legislations and
the requirement 24 7 of compliance to duties of care under national laws in
order to prevent and detect certain categories of illegal activities. 248 There-
fore, although the U.S. and French schemes are converging in order to limit
ISP liability, it is obvious that differences found in principles of national
substantive general law will still cause different treatments of ISP liability
in each country.24 9 Moreover, in both countries legislative attempts to reg-
those means. Law No. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000, art. 43-7, J.O., Aug. 2, 2000, p.
11903; JCP 2000, 111, Aperqu Rapide, 1739.
241. See supra Part 1.B.3.a. Noticeably, the French Conseil Constitutionnel [Constitu-
tional Council] struck down a provision defining ISPs' duty to take diligences appropriees
when third-parties inform them that they are hosting illegal or damaging content. Law
No. 2000-719 of August 1, 2000, art. 43-8, J.O., Aug. 2, 2000, p. 11903; JCP 2000, 111,
Aper~u Rapide, 1739; see also Cons. const., no. 2000-433 DC of July 27, 2000, J.O., Feb.
8, 2000; JCP 2000, Aper~u Rapide, 1739 (invalidating part of art. 43-8).
242. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1998); see also Cunard et al., supra note 8, at 393-94.
243. French Secretary of State Catherine Tasca, Address to the French Stnat, supra
note 182; see also French Secretary of State Catherine Tasca, Address before the French
Assemblee Nationale, supra note 188.
244. JEAN BoULOuls, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DE L'U.E. 425-32 (5th ed., Domat Droit
Public, Montchrestien) (1995).
245. See the French legislative debates in the French Senat and the French Assemble
Nationale, supra note 182.
246. Directive on E-Commerce, supra note 234, at "Whereas" (45).
247. Id. "Whereas" (46).
248. Id. "Whereas" (47).
249. See French Secretary of State Catherine Tasca, Address before the French Senat,
supra note 182.
Did France choose to reproduce the results of the U.S. model? I do not think so.
Our tradition is to protect the different kinds of freedom, not only to proclaim
them. However, in the name of a great principle [Free Speech], it is possible to
praise racism, to support revisionist thesis, to develop confusion between infor-
mation and advertisement .... This is not worthy of our understanding of the
notion of freedom of choice.
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ulate the Internet went through constitutional scrutiny that led to some
modifications of the intended regulations. 250 However, convergence might
increase, as the French government is about to pass a bill (projet de loi)
which would make it one of the first EU member states that transpose the
EU Directive on E-commerce.
d. Recent Developments Should Increase the Pace of Convergence
The French government's tentative draft of the law on Information Society
states that: (1) hosting service providers and IAPs have no general obliga-
tion to screen contents transmitted on the Internet; (2) hosting service
providers may incur civil liability if they have actual knowledge of a mani-
festly illicit content and still omit to remove it; (3) judges can resort to
increased powers to take down illicit contents; (4) ISPs cannot be liable for
contents they transmit or temporarily stock when they do not provide any
further services. 25 1
Article 11 and 13 of the tentative bill on Information Society trans-
pose the dispositions of the EU Directive on E-commerce that concern ISP
civil liability. Article 11 of Title I, Chapter II of the tentative bill modifies
the text of the Amendement Bloche to remove any reference to penal liability
for ISPs. 25 2 This is in accordance with the comments of the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel on the earlier draft and with the difficulty of holding an ISP liable
as an accomplice of a direct infringer, as in most of the cases an ISP has not
the requisite mens rea. Article 11 also makes clear that, unless the judicial
authority orders it, an ISP has no obligation to promptly take down an
infringing Web site save when it has actual knowledge of obviously illicit
content.25 3 Moreover, Article 11 states that ISPs "are subject neither to a
general obligation to monitor the contents they transmit or that they stock,
nor to a general obligation to actively look for facts or circumstances that
would unveil illicit activities."'2 54 Under Article 11 and Article 12 of Title I,
Chapter II of the tentative bill, the President of the Tribunal de Grande
Instance has increased power to order ISPs to remove access to information
Id.
250. In the U.S., the Supreme Court struck down some provisions of the CDA that
attempted to regulate children's access to indecent material because they unduly bur-
dened protected speech. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997). For comments on
risks of pre-censorship at ISPs' level under U.S. Internet regulations, see STEVEN E.
MILLER, CIVILIZING CYBERSPACE: POLICY, POWER AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY 131
(1996). In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel censored most of the dispositions of the
Amendement Fillon, Cons. const., no. 96-378 DC, July 23, 1996, J.O., July 27, 1996, p.
11400; D. 1998, Somm. 146, and some of the dispositions of the Amendement Bloche.
Cons. const., no. 2000-433 DC of July 27, 2000, J.O., Feb. 8, 2000, p. 11922;JCP 2000,
Aper~u Rapide, 1739.
251. Ministere de l'6conomie, des finances et de l'industrie [French Department for
Economy, Finance and Industry], Projet de Loi sur la soci~t de l'information [tentative
bill on Information Society], tit. 2, §2, arts. 11-13, at http://www.finances.gouv.fr, Vie
des Entreprises: Acc~s Th~matique: Nouvelles Technologies: Projet de loi Files (last vis-
ited Sept. 6, 2001).
252. Id. art. 11(l)(a).
253. Id. art. 11(1)(b).
254. Id. art. 11(11).
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that would cause damages. 255 Finally, Article 13 of the tentative bill pro-
vides for a safe harbor for system caching;256 it also provides for the
absence of civil liability for ISPs when they merely transmit information
and do nothing more.25 7
These observations show a trend toward harmonization in the legal
standards and methods of analysis for assessing ISPs' liability. The Euro-
pean directive will lead the French legal framework even closer to the U.S.
framework with respect to the standard of assessment of ISP liability.
Nonetheless, this harmonization does not concern the substance of the
legal analysis. Substantive laws are different in the U.S. and in France.
Neither the European directive, nor the French tentative bill on Information
Society provides any definitions of the infringements that may trigger
injunctions from French courts. These measures only deal with the defini-
tion of procedures to assess liability and requirements that ISPs should
comply with to fall under safe-harbor provisions. Therefore, each judicial
system may still provide a different outcome for a given issue. The French
Yahoo! case illustrates this observation.
III. Outstanding International Differences
A. The Yahoo! Case
Plaintiffs LICRA (Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme),
UEJF (Union des Etudiants Juifs de France) and MRAP (Mouvement contre le
Racisme, l'Antisonitisme et pour la Paix) brought suit against Yahoo! to have
this ISP disable access to messages and images relating to the Nazi ideology
available at the "Yahoo.com" Web site.258 French users could read some
parts of Hitler's Mein Kampf and of the anti-Semitic book Le protocole des
sages de Sion (in its French version) on Yahoo!'s "Geocities" pages.259
French users could also see Third Reich memorabilia on Yahoo!'s auction
site.260 Referring to Article R645-2 of the French Penal Code, the display
of Nazi products for sale is a crime.261
Thus, in May 22, 2000, Judge Gomez ordered Yahoo! to take remedial
measures to dissuade and to make it impossible for French users to consult
the Nazi oriented Web pages.262 Yahoo! defended itself on the ground of
the technical issue, arguing that it was neither possible to screen illegal
content nor to determine whether the users who consulted the contents at
255. Id. art. 11(11), 12.
256. Id. art. 13.
257. Id.
258. Jean Eaglesham, International Economy: Yahoo! Yields to Ruling by French Court,
FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Jan. 4, 2001, at 9.
259. Yahoo doitfiltrer l'accs a un site d'encheres nazies, LE MONDE INTERACTIF, Nov. 20,
2000, available at http://archives.lemonde.fr.
260. Jonathan D. Glater, Ideas & Trends: Hemming in the World Wide Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2001, at 5.
261. C. PEN. art. R645-2 (Fr.).
262. Ass'n Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo!, TGI Paris, Ord. R., D.
2000, IRI72, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurifr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
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issue were French. 26 3 Therefore the judge appointed three international
experts to assess the technical difficulties and efficiency of the necessary
double screening.2 64 Classically, the outcome depended on the technical
abilities of the ISP and implicitly on its good faith use of them to comply
with legal requirements.265 The experts concluded that it was possible to
locate 70% of the users, a figure that could be increased by 20% if Yahoo!
were to ask the users who request the illegal contents to declare their
nationality. 26 6 This figure led the judge to conclude that Yahoo! could
comply quite efficiently with his previous orders. 2 67 With regard to the
screening for content, the judge affirmed his prior ruling and applied the
traditional solution of the French case law on point.26 8 Again, he stressed
that Yahoo! was able to implement an editorial screening with search
engines.26 9 Therefore, the judge held Yahoo! liable under the French Penal
law and ordered it to disable access to the illegal content for French
users.2 70 The judge then granted a three-month period to Yahoo! to allow
it to comply with his orders. 27 1 At the end of this period, the judge's ordi-
nance enjoined Yahoo! to pay FF 100,000272 per day in case it would not
comply with its legal obligations. 2 73
B. A Traditional Solution and a Challenge to U.S. Constitutional Rights
1. An Original Application of a Traditional Legal Analysis
The focus on ISPs' technical ability to screen for content is a traditional
focus of the French jurisprudence. 2 74 It is also part of the U.S. functional
analysis. 2 75 The way the French judge carried on his functional analysis,
however, is surprising. First, he did not follow the former jurisprudence of
263. Conclusions de la Dfense [brief on behalf of Yahoo!], May 15, 2000, available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522-cc-def.pdf (last visited Sept.
6, 2001); see also Conclusions de la Dfense [brief on behalf of Yahoo!], July 24, 2000,
available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000081l-cc-def.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2001).
264. Union des Etudiantsjuifs de France, TGI Paris, Aug. 11, 2000, Ord. R., at http://
www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=decisions/responsabilite/
ordtgi-paris_110800.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
265. Valrie S~dallian, Commentaire de l'affaire Yahoo! (Oct. 2000), at http://
www.juriscom.net/chr/2/fr20001024.htm.
266. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. r6., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219, available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis
20001120.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2001). The experts' report is available at http://
www.legalis.net/jnet/2000/actualite 11_2000.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2001).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. S~dallian, supra note 265.
270. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. ref., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219.
271. Id.
272. Almost U.S.D. 13,600.
273. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. rdf., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219.
274. S~dallian, supra note 265.
275. See supra Part I.A.
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his own court.276 Second, he expressly stressed he was assessing the good
faith of the ISP-defendant in using its technical device. 277 The appointed
experts, however, did not give a unanimous conclusion regarding the tech-
nical ability to screen illegal content and to screen users.278 The issue of
good faith attempt to remedy the situation with the technical means availa-
ble seems to be a critical factor. Judge Gomez noticed that Yahoo! already
disallowed the sale of living animals, body parts, cigarettes, and products
related to pedophilia on its auction Web site.2 79 Then, the judge stressed
that it would not be too costly to ban Nazi memorabilia from the auction
Web site.2 80
In contrast, two days after Judge Gomez decided the Yahoo! case in
favor of UEJF, another judge rendered his verdict on similar facts and
276. UEJF brought suit against French ISPs to have them disable access to anti-Semitic
messages they hosted. Plaintiff UEJF asked the judge to appoint an expert to assess the
technical means available to achieve its demand. The judge refused and stressed that
although UEJF's fears were worthy, freedom of speech amounted to a principle of funda-
mental value. Therefore, he concluded that an expert report would have no legal value
for the case at hand as there was no way to decide the settlement of a global prohibition
system based on a priori censorship. Such a decision would, in effect, contradict Article
5 of the French Civil Code that forbids judges from "decid[ing] by way of a general and
rule-making decision the cases submitted to them." (Article 5 simply states that judges
must not create the law and encroach on the legislature's domain). Ass'n Union des
Etudiants Juifs de France v. Calvacom, TGI Paris, June 6, 1996, Ord. ref., at http://
www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/French/affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=internet-responsabilite.htm
(last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
277. The judge stressed that Yahoo! was able to send online advertisements in French
to French users who consult Yahoo!'s Web sites. Thus, he concluded that Yahoo! could
determine whether or not its users were French citizens. Union des Etudiants Juifs de
France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. rdf., J.C.P. 2000, Actu., 2219. The defendant
strongly disagreed with this reading and argued that the screening it was performing was
not purporting to be as precise as the legal order would make it necessary. Conclusions
de la Dfense [brief on behalf of Yahoo!], July 24, 2000, available at http://
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000811-cc-def.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2001). Note that the approach of the French judge is similar to the one the Religious
Technology court had adopted in the U.S. In Religious Technology, the court concluded
that the defendant-ISP Netcom could disable access selectively as it had previously sus-
pended specific subscribers' accounts in numerous occasions. Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line, 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
278. One of the experts appointed by the judge filed a separate opinion in which he
expressed his doubts as to the ability to know with a sufficient certainty the nationality
of users. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. rdf., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219. The defendant constantly argued on the technical issue. Conclusions
de la Dfense [brief on behalf of Yahoo!], July 24, 2000, available at http://
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis200008l1-cc-def.pdf (last visited Sept. 6,
2001). The defendant also stressed the contradiction between the expert report and the
judge's conclusions. Id. For a general argument on the practical impossibility to imple-
ment screening procedures, see Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet
Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1257, 1288-92, (1998) (stating that filters are either over or
under inclusive and that they lack flexibility to truly reflect legal norms).
279. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. ref., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219; see also Valfrie Sedallian, Commentaire de l'affaire Yahoo! (2) (an.
2001), at http://www.juriscom.net/chr/2/fr20010112.htm.
280. Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, TGI Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ord. r f., J.C.P.
2000, Actu., 2219.
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issues against UEJF.28 1 In this case, Multimania hosted a Web site entitled
"nsdap" (an acronym for the Nazi party) whose content related to Adolf
Hitler, the Nazi ideology, Nazi texts, and symbols. 2 82 Once on notice, Mul-
timania removed access to the Web site. Multimania had also supervised
the Web sites it hosted by use of a search engine and key words relating to
usual illegal content found on the Internet.28 3 Unfortunately, Multimania
had not used the acronym "nsdap" for its search.2 84 However, the court
found that Multimania acted reasonably and promptly given its compe-
tence and the technical means available to detect illegal content. 28 5
Finally, the court held that Multimania was not liable.28 6 On the contrary,
Judge Gomez did not find evidence of Yahoo!'s good faith attempt to rem-
edy the situation at stake.
The Yahoo! court confirmed the trend of the French case law in finding
an editorial liability of ISPs based on the general law - here in its penal
branch.2 8 7 Again, this result is not surprising as other courts previously
did the same through the use of the French Civil Code.28 8 What really
shocked U.S. commentators must have been the substantive law that pre-
vailed and the French judge's acceptance of jurisdiction over the subject
matter at stake. 28 9
2. Divergent Substantive Laws
The ban on the display of Nazi symbols and messages under French penal
law is at odds with the free speech principle found in the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.290 Such an amazing divergence between France
and the U.S. has nothing to do with the procedures and principles used to
assess ISP liability. It is the consequence of the application of different
substantive laws. 29 1 Despite the definition of safe harbors, ISPs still fall
281. Ass'n Union des EtudiantsJuifs de France v. SA Multimania Prod., TGI Nanterre,
May 24, 2000 (holding that the hosting service provider has no obligation to scrutinize
in detail and in depth the Web sites it hosts), at http://www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/
affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=internet responsabilite.htm (last visited, Sept. 6, 2001).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See supra Part I.A.2.
288. See supra Part I.A.2.
289. Glater, supra note 260; see also Sebastian Mallaby, Le Net, c'est Moi: The French
Attempt to Rule Their Cyberspace, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2000, at A21.
290. S~dallian, supra note 265.
291. Id. Concerning the issue of the prohibition of display and trade of Nazi-related
objects and texts, it also illustrates distinct histories that led to differences in substantive
laws. It is easy to understand the European sensitivity to this issue. In France, the Nazi
ideology relates to universal disgust towards war crime and crimes against humanity
some of which took place within the French territory. It also refers to the period of the
German Occupation, of the collaboration, the poignte de main de Montoire, and of the
shameful government of Vichy. These wounds, deeply rooted in French history, explain
the stand of the French Penal Law with respect to Nazi side-products. These reasons, of
course, cannot be and will never be found in the U.S. History is one of several factors
that explain differences between the French and U.S. approaches to free speech. See
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under the scope of the general law (droit commun) in France and of the
common law in the United States. That is to say, whereas the legislature
and the case law have devised specific rules that concern ISPs, they are still
liable under the principles found in the general law.29 2 This situation
should not change under the EU directive. 29 3 Thus, the Yahoo! decision is
sound both with respect to the French jurisprudence and the French and
European current statutory frameworks, although the statutory trend is to
increase the number of situations in which ISPs could benefit from safe
harbors.
Nobody truly expects the French general law to be the same as the
common law developed in the U.S. The Internet, however, makes differ-
ences between national laws even more obvious and burdensome because
it is an interactive tool that falls under several jurisdictions at the same
time. 29 4
3. Jurisdiction and the Internet: French and U.S. Approaches
French judges traditionally consider themselves competent to hear a case
so long as the harm occurred within French territory, which is always the
case for Internet matters as the allegedly damaging material can be con-
sulted from French territory.29 5 Interestingly, the application of American
case law rules for U.S. jurisdiction as applied to Internet matters might
have led to the same result under the facts of the Yahoo! case. A majority of
American courts have followed a "sliding scale" approach to take jurisdic-
tion in Internet matters. 29 6 A court will take jurisdiction if the non-resi-
dent defendant-ISP has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum,
generally Stephen J. Roth, The Laws of Six Countries: An Analytical Comparison, in UNDER
THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES 177
(Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993).
292. See supra Part 11.
293. See supra Part II.
294. See generally Michael J. O'Sullivan, International Copyright: Protection for Copy-
right Holders in the Internet Age, 13 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2000); Jennifer M. Driscoll, It's a
Small World After All: Conflict of Laws and Copyright Infringement on the Information
Superhighway, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 939 (1999); Samuel Fifer & Michael Sachs, The
Price of International Free Speech: Nations Deal With Defamation of the Internet, 8
DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. & POLY 1 (1997).
295. Sdallian, supra note 265. For torts, article 46 of the French Nouveau Code de
Procedure Civile [New Code of Civil Procedure] entitles a victim to choose either to bring
a suit where the event that is the proximate cause of the damage took place, where the
harm occured (lex loci delicti), or where the defendant has his regular residence (actor
sequiturforum rei). N.C.P.C, art. 46 (Fr.). It is on this ground that in Lacoste the TGI of
Nanterre found itself competent to hear the case. Lacoste v. Sociktt Multimania, TGI
Nanterre, Dec. 8, 1999, J.C.P. 1999, I1, 10279, note F. Olivier, E. Barbry (stating that
"the harm materializes where data are downloaded by anyone who wants to connect to
the Internet."), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurifr/img/tginanterre
19991208.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2001).
296. Christopher Paul Boam, The Internet, Information and the Culture of Regulatory
Change: A Modern Renaissance, 9 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 175, 191-92 (2001); Mark C.
Dearing, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Can the Traditional Principles and
Landmark Cases Guide the Legal System Into the 21st Century?, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 4
(1999).
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purposefully availed itself of the forum's laws, the claim arises from these
contacts, and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 29 7 Three categories
compose the "sliding scale":
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. if the defendant enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in
foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make
information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by inter-
active Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host com-
puter. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange
of information that occurs on the Web site.29 8
Yahoo! promoted goods on its auction Web site and also made adver-
tisements in French,2 99 which shows a specific intent to reach a French
audience to promote and sell goods to French citizens. Thus, Yahoo! could
fall into the first category of the sliding scale. However, many determina-
tive facts fail to reach a firm conclusion on this issue. For instance, courts
usually analyze the quantity and quality of contacts with the forum state to
decide the issue of minimum contacts.300 Moreover, there are no facts that
permit a conclusion as to whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction by a
French court is reasonable. However, it is sufficient to note that under the
prevailing facts, even the application of American case law solutions could
lead to the conclusion that the French jurisdiction over Yahoo! was proper.
Therefore, the Yahoo! case does not reflect a general contradiction
between specific regulations of the Internet in France and in the U.S.
(although some contradictions do exist). Rather, this is the consequence of
substantial differences found in the general law of each country that inter-
fere with the assessment of ISP liability. In effect, ISPs are still liable under
the general law of each country.
297. This is the application of the traditional "minimum contacts" doctrine developed
by the U.S. Supreme Court in a well-known combination of landmark cases. See Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (W.D. Pa. 1997); see also
Dearing, supra note 296.
298. Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (internal citations omitted); see also Boam,
supra note 296, at 191-92.
299. Mere advertisements on a Web site do not amount to the required minimum
contacts by themselves. See Millennium Enter. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d
907, 916 (D.Or. 1999) (finding that "[m]ost courts ... decline to assert jurisdiction
based solely on Web site advertising.).
300. See Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (holding that the Internet sales of two crafts through an e-bay auction Web site
were not sufficient to find the required minimum contacts to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over the non-resident defendant); Dearing, supra note 296, 95 27-28.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Both the French and the U.S. case law have developed similar solutions
regarding the definition of ISP liability. In both countries, the legal uncer-
tainty that arose out of inconsistent cases was an important factor that led
legislatures to implement specific regulatory schemes. In France, internal
and external factors influenced the legislature in a way that made it enact
regulations based on principles similar to those found in U.S. regulations.
However, both the French and the U.S. legislatures decided that the general
law would usually govern ISP liability. Therefore, in spite of an apparent
convergence of both the French and the U.S. schemes, both systems some-
times lead to different solutions that reflect differences in substantive
national laws.
The Yahoo! case is a striking illustration of this fact in the area of free
speech.30 1 It is not a remote and unique example in Europe.3 0 2 The
Yahoo! case demonstrates that ISPs have to consider domestic legislation in
order to avoid legal and business risks.30 3 These burdens are rather fore-
seeable and the situation of Internet companies is similar to that of compa-
nies that avail themselves to the privileges of different forums when they
put their goods into the stream of commerce of several markets. They must
comply with domestic product liability legislations and domestic corporate
laws for instance. Compliance with domestic laws amounts to the cost of
doing business in specific countries via the Internet.30 4 The interactive
nature of the Internet, however, can cause some contents to reach unin-
tended users. Given the way French judges find themselves competent to
decide on Internet-related wrongs, U.S. ISPs are at risk of being held liable
under French laws while complying with U.S. laws.30 5 Under the prevail-
ing French bases for jurisdiction, French plaintiffs might well take advan-
301. This Note does not purport to assess the merits of the French Yahoo! case for
Free Speech purposes. It does not analyze whether the Internet should be an area of
self-regulation either.
302. In 1995, Compuserve blocked access to 200 sex-oriented newsgroups for four
million of its subscribers worldwide because Bavarian officials began an investigation
on Compuserve's alleged violations of Germany's anti-pornography law. Kim L. Rap-
paport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional
Democracies With Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 765, 788-89 (1998). In February 1997, German authorities even indicted the head
of Compuserve's German subsidiary for failure to prevent dissemination of illegal mate-
rial on its online service. Id. at 791.
303. In terms of damages and of public image for instance. See Goldstein, supra note
23, at 593 (stating that to make profits, Internet companies "must charge enough money
to cover their expenses and liabilities. They will not be able to cover liabilities that they
cannot predict. An unknown or vague standard of liability will frustrate this end.").
304. Referring to R. Raysman and P. Brown, Internet companies have adapted their
way of doing business to comply with the laws of foreign jurisdictions. They report that
Amazon.com "stopped shipping copies of Mein Kampf to customers in Germany," and
that "eBay has restricted the Nazi-related memorabilia that is available through all their
auctions." Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Yahoo! Decision in France Fuels E-Commerce
Sovereignty Debate, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 12, 2000, at 3.
305. However, this does not mean that a French judgment would necessarily be
enforced in the U.S. in case the defendant-ISP has its property in the U.S. In the Yahoo!
case, defendant Yahoo! considered the possibility of letting the French judgment go
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tage of them to practice forum shopping. However, judges might use the
requirement of actual damage and causation (the alleged Internet wrong
must have caused an actual damage to the plaintiff) to curb abuses. Moreo-
ver, for defendants whose assets are not in France, judges have to consider
the probability for plaintiff to obtain an exequatur to get enforcement of a
French decision in a foreign forum. Those factors provide some reasons
not to overstate the risks of forum shopping and undue use of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction.
One solution that would decrease ISPs' legal risks would concern the
choice of forum and thus the choice of the applicable law to the dispute.
The criterion of the destination of the data (the public that an ISP intents
to target) is fair, as an ISP that voluntarily directs its services into one
forum should expect to be potentially liable in this forum. 30 6 Of course,
courts should deeply scrutinize the defense of lack of volitional act to tar-
get a specific public to make sure it does not amount to fraudulent evasion
of statutory provisions of the forum at stake (fraude a la loi).3 0 7
Other solutions could be the application of the law of the country
where the Internet server is located, or the laws of every nation where the
infringing data can be consulted.30 8 Application of the former theory
would entail a race to the bottom by providing incentives to ISPs to operate
business from forums where substantive laws are more to their advantage
in terms of liability.30 9 The latter theory would be too restrictive of Free
Speech since it would oblige ISPs to cumulatively comply with all the most
stringent requirements of several national laws.310 Anyway, application of
the criterion of the destination of data is at odds with the well-settled
before a U.S. judge for enforcement. Lisa Guernsey, Yahoo Seeks to Block Judgment, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2000, at C4.
306. This solution would be consistent with the traditional minimum contact stan-
dard found in the U.S. O'Sullivan, supra note 294, at 30-31.
307. S~dallian, supra note 265.
308. Driscoll, supra note 294, at 939 (presenting the different potential solutions
regarding the choice of law applicable to Internet copyright infringements and assessing
the merits of each).
309. Boam, supra note 296, at 195, 201 (noting that "[s]ome Internet-based busi-
nesses may choose to remove operations from forums where laws are not conducive to
the services they provide," and reporting that PSInet, an ISP, relocated its servers out of
Germany after a Bavarian court convicted Compuserve's German manager under Ger-
man anti-pornography laws.).
310. Id. In Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
could also come into play regarding the protection of Free Speech. The Convention has
already entered into force in France. Article 10 § 1 of the Convention provides: "Every-
one has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers." However, article 10 § 2 of the Convention pro-
vides for instances in which free speech might be limited. Those instances include the
prevention of disorder, of crime, of morals, the preservation of confidential information,
of the reputation of others, of the rights of others (including intellectual property rights
and personal rights like the right to protect one's honor and reputation, to protect one's
name, image, privacy). European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, ETS 005, Apr. 11, 1950, available at
http://conventions.coe.int (last visited Apr. 8, 2000) (Council of Europe official Web
site, Search on Conventions and Agreements in the European Treaty Series (ETS) Files).
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French solution of the lex loci delicti.3 11 There is no reason why French
courts would change their position. The French legislature could then
devise a specific conflict of jurisdiction rule for Internet matters. The
French legislature, however, does not seem to envision such a course of
action. However, the Conseil d'Etat (the highest French administrative
jurisdiction) stressed that concerning Internet wrongdoings, an interna-
tional convention could be envisioned for determining the applicable law,
the competent jurisdiction and the rules relating to exequatur.312
Therefore, it is illusory to think that ISPs' legal risks can decrease so
long as French and U.S. general, laws remain different. 313 However, the
probability of the occurrence of the risk will decrease by continuing to
harmonize the specific principles under which courts assess ISP liability.
Such harmonization would provide incentive for self-regulation 31 4 in order
to avoid well-defined risks and to take advantage of safe harbor schemes.
Well-defined regulations would allow ISPs to anticipate stable risks. Stabil-
ity makes it more profitable to develop the technical means necessary to
comply with national laws, which would further legislative goals. Provid-
ing clear and harmonized conditions to fall under safe-harbor provisions
would lower the effects of divergent substantive laws on ISPs that operate
in the international arena because of the specific nature of the Internet
311. Note that under Article 14 of the French Civil Code, French plaintiffs have a
priviltge dejuridiction based on their citizenship: French plaintiffs, whatever their claim,
can bring suit before French courts. French courts have not taken jurisdiction for
Internet-related matters on this ground, because foreign courts would then certainly
refuse to grant an exequatur to a French plaintiff trying to get recognition and enforce-
ment of the French judgment abroad.
312. "A l'avenir, une convention internationale pourrait . .. etre envisagee pour deter-
miner la loi applicable, le tribunal competent et les regles d'exequatur." Rapport du Con-
seil d'Etat, Internet et les reseaux numtriques (1998), at 174. Actually, the Council of
Europe is preparing a Convention on Crime in Cyber-Space. Draft Convention on
Cyber-Crime, Draft no. 25 REV, at http://conventions.coe.int (last visited Apr. 8, 2000)
(Council of Europe official Web site, Draft Treaties Files). Article 9 of the draft refers to
"Offences Related to Child Pornography"; article 10 refers to "Infringements of Copy-
right and Related Rights"; articles 11 through 13 provide for "Ancillary Liability and
Sanctions"; article 23 even tackles the issue of jurisdiction, but it allows judges to take
jurisdiction as provided under their national laws and it does not limit extra-territorial
jurisdiction; finally, chapter II of the draft provides for international cooperation. Id.
313. For a comparison of French and U.S. Copyright laws, see Driscoll, supra note
294, at 939. For a discussion of the difference concerning defamation law in an interna-
tional setting, see Fifer & Sachs, supra note 294, at 16.
314. As a general conclusion for the Yahoo! case, Yahoo! announced that it would stop
the display of Nazi objects on its auction site. Yahoo va interdire la vente d'objets nazis sur
ses sites d'encheres, available at http://fr.news.yahoo.com, Yahoo! Actualit s Files (last
visitedJan. 3, 2001). However, Yahoo!'s public communication seems to be very distinct
in France and in the U.S. since Yahoo! brought a suit in the U.S. to have a federal court
declare that the French judgment is not enforceable in the U.S. French Court Orders
Yahoo to Block Access by French Users to Sites that Auction Nazi Merchandise; Yahoo
Responds by Filing Suit in U.S. Federal Court Seeking Declaration that French Judgment is
Not Enforceable, ENT. L. REP., Jan. 2001, available at LExIs, News Library. The court
declared that the First Amendment "precludes enforcement within the United States of a
French order intended to regulate the content of [Yahoo!'s] speech over the Internet."
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La ligue contre le racisme et l'antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194
(N.D. Cal. 2001).
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network.3 15 Then, it would be fair to hold liable ISPs that avail themselves
of business opportunities in several nations (that is to say ISPs that target
these nations' consumers) without respecting the legal rules of these
nations or the requirements to fall under safe-harbor provisions. The fair-
ness would come from the opportunity ISPs would have to make a cost-
benefit analysis balancing the cost of implementing screening technology,
the opportunity cost of refusing to transfer data in one national market,
and the legal risks of being held liable under the laws of that nation. As a
conclusion, in the words of a French scholar, dans le cybermonde, le droit
n'a pas vocation d etre virtuel.3 16
315. Internet is a global medium. Therefore compliance with several systems of law
might be excessively burdensome, depending both on the complexity of these laws and
on the availability of technical means to screen contents and subscribers ("zoning" the
Internet). Christopher Wolf, Free Ideas, France and Yahoo!, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2000, at
A42.
316. In the cyber world, Law will not be virtual. Michel Vivant, Cybermonde: Droit et
droits des reseaux, JCP. G., 1996, at 401. For French articles dealing with how legal rules
may apply to the Internet, see F. Meynot, S. Marcellin-Taupenas, Internet serait-il un no
man's land juridique?, BULLETIN D'ACTUALITE, LAMY DROIT DE L'INFORMATIQUE, no. 81
(1996), at 1-3.

